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Mandatory Disclosure: California Bar Refuses to
Adopt Proposed Rule to Confront Client Perjury
I. INTRODUCTION
The California Rules of Professional Conduct1 (California Rules)
were amended in 1975 to effect numerous changes in the law of pro-
fessional responsibility in California. 2 The 1975 amendments did not,
however, adequately address the ethical dilemma faced by criminal
defense attorneys confronted with a client who insists upon taking
the witness stand for the sole purpose of committing perjury. 3
Although the California Rules instruct attorneys confronted with
this situation to withdraw from the case, this course of action has not
always been an appropriate or available alternative.4
In 1985, the Board of Governors of the California State Bar Associ-
ation (the Board) authorized the Committee on Professional Respon-
sibility and Conduct (COPRAC) to survey the changes in California
law in the area of professional responsibility. A subcommittee was
directed to evaluate the American Bar Association's recently adopted
Model Rules of Professional Conduct,5 as well as other changes in
the area of professional ethics in order to determine whether revi-
sions to the existing California Rules were needed.6 In September
1985, COPRAC and its subcommittee presented an interim report to
1. Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California Rule 1-100 (effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1975, 14 Cal. 3d). [hereinafter CALIFORNIA RULES].
2. Proposed New Rules of Professional Conduct, 49 CAL. ST. B.J. 542 (1974); see
Comments of Members Requested on Proposed New Rules of Professional Conduct, 48
CAL. ST. B.J. 328 (1973). The State Bar of California considered the adoption of the
American Bar Association's Model Rules. See MODEL RULES infra note 5.
3. Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 809, 823-24 (1977). "Client per-
jury" has become the term of art to describe the situation in which a defendant, seek-
ing to exonerate himself in a criminal or civil trial, commits perjury on the witness
stand.
4. The California Rules require that the attorney obtain the court's approval in
order to withdraw from the case. At some point in the course of the trial, however,
the judge may decide that withdrawal would be too prejudicial to the interests of the
client. In such cases, the judge would deny the motion for withdrawal. Dunetz, Sur-
prise Client Perjury: Some Questions and Proposed Solutions to an Old Problem, 29
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 407, 434-36 (1984); see generally CALIFORNIA RULES supra note 1,
Rule 2-111.
5. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) (adopted by the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
6. Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar
the Committee on Professional Standards. 7 The Committee ex-
tended the survey for another year to allow for the completion of the
report.8 In the summer of 1986, the subcommittee submitted the 1986
Discussion Draft to the Board which thereafter authorized its publi-
cation. 9 From August through December of 1986, the Board was
open to public comment concerning the Proposed Rules.10 After this
120-day comment period, the subcommittee was reappointed by the
Board.11 The subcommittee, under the new title of Commission on
the Revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Commission), was
expected to review the comments received, make any appropriate
recommendations in light of these comments, and submit its pro-
posed amendments to COPRAC and the Board Committee in July of
1987.12 This draft will be presented to the California Supreme Court
for official enactment. 13
The 1986 proposed amendments to the Rules of Professional Con-
duct, recommended by the subcommittee and contained in the 1986
Discussion Draft (1986 Proposed Rules), would have substantially
changed the Rules of Professional Conduct in California in the area
of client perjury. Proposed Rule 4-102(E) would have made the dis-
closure of client perjury mandatory,14 notwithstanding the fact that
the evidence or facts surrounding its disclosure were protected by the
attorney's duty of confidentiality to his client.'5 By forcing attorneys
to disclose false evidence to the court, the proposed rule sought to
shift the burden of resolving the problem of client perjury from the
attorney to the court. Had this proposed rule been adopted, it would
have provided California attorneys with a bright-line test to manage
the ethical issues surrounding client perjury. But despite the fact
that the rules requiring mandatory disclosure of client perjury were
rejected, it is significant that these rules were given serious consider-
ation in light of the respect traditionally extended by the California
of California, vol. 1, pt I at i Commission for the Revision of the Rules of Professional
Conduct [hereinafter 1987 Proposed Rules].
7. Id. at i, ii.
8. Id. at ii. See also Proposed Amendments to the Rules of Professional Conduct,
at i (Committee on Professional Responsibility and Conduct, Subcommittee to Study
the Rules of Professional Conduct) (Discussion Draft, 1986) [hereinafter 1986 Proposed
Rules].
9. Telephone interview with Karen Betzner (Oct. 7, 1987) (Director of Profes-
sional Competence, State Bar of California) [hereinafter Betzner Conversation, Oct. 7,
1987].
10. Betzner Conversation, Oct. 7, 1987, supra note 9.
11. Id. The Commission received 35 comments concerning Proposed Rule 4-102
alone. See 1987 Proposed Rules, supra note 6, at vol. 3, 4.
12. See 1987 Proposed Rules supra note 6, at i-ii.
13. 1987 Proposed Amendments, supra note 6, at ii.
14. 1986 Proposed Amendments, supra note 8, at 7.
15. See supra note 14. See also 1987 Proposed Rules, supra note 6, vol. 4, at 76
(Professor Gregory Ogden's letter to Karen Betzner, 1986).
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State Bar Association for the attorney's duty of confidentiality.16 As
a result of the introduction of the 1986 Proposed Rules, the discus-
sion of the issue of mandatory disclosure has been regenerated.
Under the 1975 California Rules, the attorney is given very little
guidance to resolve issues surrounding client perjury.17 It was the in-
tention of the drafters of the proposed rules to provide a bright-line
test upon which California attorneys could rely in confronting these
ethical issues.' 8 A mandatory disclosure rule would have provided
such guidance by establishing the parameters of the attorney's duty
to a client. Although one may disagree with the parameters pro-
posed, it is clear that some guidelines are needed.
The commission's final draft (1987 Proposed Rule) failed to include
a rule requiring the disclosure of client perjury.' 9 Instead, the 1987
proposed rules resemble the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity. If the 1987 proposed rules are adopted by the supreme court, Cal-
ifornia attorneys will be relegated to resolving these ethical issues
without the benefit of clear, uniform guidelines from the California
Bar.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the various ethical is-
sues surrounding client perjury. Before analyzing these issues, how-
ever, the various competing ethical duties confronting attorneys will
be presented along with a review of the current ethical standards and
guidelines available to practicing attorneys confronted with this ethi-
cal dilemma. This Comment will then analyze the merits of the 1986
Proposed Rule 4-102 in order to determine the impact such a rule
would have on attorneys in practice. Finally, in light of the apparent
trend toward the enactment of these types of rules, some practical
suggestions will be offered on how to best comply with rules of ethics
requiring disclosure of client perjury.20
II. CONFLICTING ETHICAL DUTIES
A. As Officer of the Court
The criminal defense attorney faced with a client who insists upon
16. Guides to Professional Conduct for the New California Practitioner, 36 CAL.
ST. B.J. 1013, 1041-45 (1961). See infra note 164 (California has declined to adopt
mandatory disclosure rules in the past).
17. See irfra notes 129-137 and accompanying text.
18. Betzner Conversation, Oct. 7, 1987, supra note 9.
19. 1986 Proposed Rules, supra note 8, at 19 (Rule 3-100, discussion).
20. There is a distinct trend toward the acceptance of mandatory disclosure rules
throughout the United States. See infra notes 103 and 121.
presenting false evidence to the fact-finder is confronted with con-
flicting ethical duties. First, as an officer of the court, the attorney is
sworn to uphold the integrity of the judicial system.21 Since the pre-
sentation of any false evidence to the court necessarily interferes
with the court's truth-finding function, an attorney violates his duty
as an officer of the court by allowing false evidence to be offered.
This duty to maintain the integrity of the court is codified in the
California Business and Professions Code.22 Section 6068(b) declares
that "[i]t is the duty of an attorney ... (b) ... to maintain the respect
due to the court of justice and judicial officers." 23 Furthermore, the
attorney shall "employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to him or her, such means only as are consistent with truth,
and never to seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an
artifice or false statement of fact or law."24
The California Supreme Court has long recognized the attorney's
duty to the court.25 The court has noted that "[a] deliberate attempt
to cause a miscarriage of justice through perjured testimony is not a
light offense .. .. "26 In fact, the court has held that "[c]ounsel may
not offer the testimony of a witness which he knows to be untrue.
To do so may constitute subornation of perjury." 27 Although the
court is confident that the attorney's duty to the court mandates the
disclosure of unprivileged false evidence, the court is much more re-
luctant to require such disclosure of privileged testimony.28 Thus,
the attorney's duty to the court is limited by his duty of loyalty to the
client.
B. As Zealous Advocate
Standing in conflict with the attorney's duty to the court, is the at-
torney's duty to be the strongest advocate possible for his client's
cause. This duty is also considered vital to the effectiveness of our
21. People v. Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 793, 336 P.2d 937, 949 (1959) (the court re-
ferred to the deputy public defender as an "officer of the court"). See generally State
Bar v. Langert, 43 Cal. 2d 636, 276 P.2d 596 (1954).
22. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(b) (West 1974 & Supp. 1987).
23. Id.
24. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(d) (West 1974 & Supp. 1987).
25. Wolfram, supra note 3, at 824 (noting that the California courts are "rather
uniformly opposed to an attorney's participation in perjurious testimony." Id.) (foot-
notes omitted). See Crystal, Coqfidentiality Under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 30 U. KAN. L. REV. 215, 236-44 (1982). See generally Hinds v. State Bar, 19
Cal. 2d 87, 92-93, 119 P.2d 134, 137 (1941) (must disclose false testimony).
26. In re Jones, 208 Cal. 240, 242, 208 P. 964, 965 (1929).
27. People v. Davis, 48 Cal. 2d 241, 257, 309 P.2d 1, 10 (1957). It should be noted
that this applies where the attorney knows that a witness, other than his client, has
committed a fraud upon the court. See CODE infra note 38, D.R. 7-102(B)(2).
28. See generally Radin, The Privilege of Con1fidential Communication Between
Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 494-95 (1928).
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adversarial system. 29 The attorney's role in the system is based upon
the belief that only by the interaction and conflict between diametri-
cally opposed positions will the truth be revealed to the courts.30
Once this assumption is accepted, logic dictates that the greater the
freedom of advocacy, the greater will be the effectiveness of the
truth-finding function. Proponents of this position argue that a vital
element in the attorney's ability to represent the client's interests is
the free flow of information from the client to the attorney.31 It is
argued that if client confidences are no longer protected, clients will
become reluctant to disclose potentially incriminating information. If
the client is inhibited from disclosing otherwise incriminating infor-
mation, the attorney will be at a significant disadvantage if the oppos-
ing side independently discovers this information. The result will be
to cripple the ability of the attorney to protect the interests of the
client. Thus, the duty of loyalty to the client, which is the source of
protecting the confidentiality of communications between the attor-
ney and client, is vital to the effectiveness of the judicial system.
The positive impact of the free flow of information upon the attor-
ney's ability to defend the interests of his client has been the primary
justification for the imposition of the duty of confidentiality upon the
attorney.32 Section 6068(e) of the California Business and Profes-
sions Code states that, "[iut is the duty of an attorney ... to maintain
inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself to preserve the
secrets, of his or her client."33
The law in California fails to clearly establish this duty. While the
California Supreme Court has held that "[t]he relationship between
an attorney and client is a fiduciary relationship of the very highest
29. Freedman, Symposium on Professional Ethics, Professional Responsibility of
the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469,
1470-74 (1966). Professor Monroe H. Freedman has suggested that "the most effective
means of determining truth is to present to a judge and jury a clash between propo-
nents of conflicting views." Id. at 1470.
30. Id. See Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66
CALIF. L. REV. 1061 (1978). "It is considered indispensable to the lawyer's function as
advocate on the theory that the advocate can adequately prepare a case only if the cli-
ent is free to disclose everything, bad as well as good." Id.
31. Hazard, supra note 30, at 1069-70. See Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d
591, 599, 691 P.2d 642, 646, 208 Cal. Rptr. 886, 890 (1984). The court noted that "the
fundamental purpose behind the [attorney-client] privilege is to safeguard the confi-
dential relationship between clients and their attorneys so as to promote full and open
discussion of the facts and tactics surrounding individual legal matters." Id.
32. Freedman, supra note 29, at 1470.
33. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1974 & Supp. 1987).
character," 34 the court has also held that the confidentiality of the
communication between the attorney and client must be strictly con-
structed in light of the fact that it works to preclude testimony from
being presented to the fact-finder.35 The California statutes only add
to the confusion; the duty to maintain the confidences of the client is
found in the same provision which mandates the attorney to uphold
the integrity of the court.36
The attorney confronted with a client who insists upon committing
perjury in his own defense is immediately faced with conflicting ethi-
cal duties. As a zealous advocate, the attorney must present every
possible defense in order to provide the client with the utmost pro-
tection. If the attorney fails to present every possible defense, the at-
torney provides his client with a defense that is less than adequate,
thereby threatening the client's vital interests. In California it seems
clear that an attorney can discharge his duty of loyalty to the client
only at the expense of his duty to the court. Unfortunately, the at-
torney cannot fully serve two masters.
III. ETHICAL STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
There are presently five main sources of guidance available to one
confronted by the ethical dilemma of a client who seeks to offer false
evidence in court. These sources are as follows: 1) the American Bar
Association Code of Professional Responsibility; 2) the American Bar
Association Defense Function Standards; 3) the Trial Lawyer's Code
of Conduct; 4) the American Bar Association Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct; and 5) the California Rules of Professional Conduct.
Each source presents various standards of conduct, and there is no
single course of action common to all that would apply in every cir-
cumstance.3 7 These five sources will be discussed in this section.
34. Clancy v. State Bar, 71 Cal. 2d 140, 146, 454 P.2d 329, 333, 77 Cal. Rptr. 657, 661
(1969).
35. Satterlee v. Bliss, 36 Cal. 489, 508 (1869). See Rigolfi v. Superior Court, 215
Cal. App. 2d 497, 501, 30 Cal. Rptr. 317, 320 (1963) (holding that "consistent with the
modern attitude of the Legislature and of the courts in the matter of discovery, and
that the [attorney-client] privilege, being a means by which the truth may be con-
cealed, must be strictly construed." Id. (citations omitted)).
36. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(b), (d), (e) (West 1974 & Supp. 1987). This
precludes one from being able to compare the statutes in order to determine which one
is subordinate to another.
37. California attorneys are subject only to the California Rules of Professional
Conduct. But where these rules are silent, the attorney may use other standards as
guidelines. See CALIFORNIA RULES supra note 1 (Rule 1-100). While it is generally rec-
ognized that the most appropriate course of action available to the attorney in this sit-
uation would be to withdraw, this alternative is not always available. Dunetz, supra
note 4, at 434-36.
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A. American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility 38
The most widely recognized standard of professional conduct is
found in the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (the Code). 39 The Code was drafted to replace the old
American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics adopted in
38. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (as adopted by the American
Bar Association) (1970) [hereinafter CODE].
39. Comment, Lying Clients and Legal Ethics: The Attorney's Unsolved Dilemma,
16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487, 494 (1983). The following State Bar Associations have
adopted the Code with some variations and amendments: ALABAMA, see 293 Ala. at
XXIII (amended, 1974) (Alabama requires only that the attorney withdraw from the
case when he discovers that the client has perpetrated a fraud upon the court, see D.R.
7-102(B)(1)); ALASKA, ALASKA SUP. CT. R. app. at 553 (1987); COLORADO, COL. REV.
STAT. 7a app. ch. 18-20 (1986) (Code of Professional Responsibility effective, Aug. 20,
1970), see People v. Schultheis, 44 Colo. App. 452, 618 P.2d 710 (1980) (reversed on
other grounds)); DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, D.C. CT. RULES ANN., vol. 1, App. A of Dis-
trict of Columbia Bar Rules (1987); GEORGIA, GA. COMP. R. & REGS., 238 Ga. 739 (1976)
(amending the Canons of Ethics established Dec. 6, 1963, 219 Ga. 873 (1963)); HAWAII,
HAW. SUP. CT. R. Exhibit A (effective Oct. 13, 1970); ILLINOIS, ILL. SUP. CT. R. art.
VIII, (1987) (effective July 1, 1980); IOWA, IOWA CODE ANN. 40 ch. 610 App. (adopted
1971, as amended 1987); KANSAS, KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 20, art. 31, Rule No. 224, 308
(1987) (Code of Professional Responsibility, effective July 1, 1982); KENTUCKY, Ky.
R.C., Desk Copy, Rule 3.130 A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility and Judicial
Conduct Recognized or Authority (1987) (effective Jan. 1, 1978) (see In re Carroll, 244
S.W.2d 474 (1951) (in which the court held that an attorney confronted with a client
who has committed perjury is subject to discipline if the attorney allows the client to
commit this perjury; it is unclear, however, whether there is mandatory disclosure
rule); LOUISIANA, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 21A, ch. 4 app., art. 16 (1974 & Supp. 1987)
(State Bar Ass'n Articles of Incorp.); MAINE, MAINE R. CT., Bar Rules, Rule 3 (Code of
Professional Responsibility); MASSACHUSETTS, SUP. JUDICIAL CT. R., Rule 3:07 (Ethics
and Practice of Law, effective Oct. 2, 1972) (1987); MICHIGAN, MICH. R. CT. 1333 (1986)
(Code of Professional Responsibility, effective 1971); NEBRASKA, Lawyer's Desk Book,
Nebraska State Bar Ass'n (Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted Mar. 1984);
NEW YORK, 29 MCKINNEY'S JUDICIARY LAW App. (1987) (effective Jan. 1, 1970); OHIO,
Rules Governing the Courts of Ohio, 955 (1987-88) (Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, adopted Oct. 5, 1970, 23 Ohio 2d 1); OKLAHOMA, OKL. CT. R. PRO. 657 (1987) (Code
of Professional Responsibility, effective Jan. 1, 1970); OREGON, ORE. R. CT. 489 (1987)
(effective June 1, 1986); PENNSYLVANIA, PENN. R. CT. 117 (1987) (Code of Professional
Responsibility, effective Feb. 27, 1974); RHODE ISLAND, R.I. GEN. LAWS vol. 2B, Sup.
CT. R., 47 (1976); SOUTH CAROLINA, S.C. CODE ANN. vol. 22, SUP. CT. R. 32 (1977 &
Supp. 1986) (effective as amended Mar. 1, 1973) (Code of Professional Responsibility);
SOUTH DAKOTA, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 7A ch. 16-18 App. (1987) (Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility) (South Dakota has adopted the 1974 Amendments prohibiting
disclosure of client fraud); TENNESSEE, TENN. SUP. CT. R. 8 (1987) (Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility) (see also TENN. CODE ANN. § 23-1-105 (1980) (requiring attorney
to maintain the confidences and secrets of client confidential)); TEXAS, TEX. CT. R.,
Desk Copy ST. BAR R. § 9 (1987) (effective Mar. 1, 1984); VERMONT, VT. STAT. ANN.,
Admin. Orders and Rules app. (1986) (as amended Feb. 15, 1986); VIRGINIA, VA. SUP.
CT. R. pt. 6 § II, 246 (1987) (effective Oct. 1, 1983); WEST VIRGINIA, W. VA. RULES ANN.
367 (1987) (effective July 1, 1970).
1908.40 The Code was originally designed to form the guidelines used
by state bar associations in developing their own rules of professional
ethics.4 1 In drafting the Code, the American Bar Association (ABA)
examined and attempted to identify the common ethical problems
confronting attorneys, in an attempt to provide adequate guidance in
the resolution of these problems.42 In recognition of the ABA's ef-
forts in the advancement of professional ethics, many states, includ-
ing California,43 have indicated that in areas where their own rules
are silent, attorneys should look to the Code for guidance.
The Code consists of three separate parts: Canons, Ethical Consid-
erations, and Disciplinary Rules. 44 The Disciplinary Rules set out
the mandatory standards of conduct, and the Canons and Ethical
Considerations interpret and explain these standards.45 The Code
states that the Disciplinary Rules establish "the minimum level of
conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to dis-
ciplinary action."46 As a result, the Disciplinary Rules are the pri-
mary source of guidance the Code provides.
The duty of confidentiality is set out in Disciplinary Rule (D.R.) 4-
101. D.R. 4-101(B)(1) provides that "[e]xcept where permitted under
D.R. 4-101(C), a lawyer shall not knowingly: (1) [r]eveal a confidence
or secret of his client."47 The Code defines a "confidence" as any
communication between the attorney and his client that would be
protected by the attorney-client privilege as interpreted in the appli-
cable jurisdiction.48 The Code defines "secrets" as all other informa-
tion gained pursuant to the professional relationship which the client
has requested to remain confidential or that, if revealed, would harm
or embarrass the client.49 The duty of confidentiality imposed by
D.R. 4-101 is broader than that of the traditional attorney-client priv-
ilege. While there is considerable overlap between the two, the attor-
ney's ethical obligations set forth in the Code are broader than the
statutory privilege.5 0
40. Erickson, The Perjurious Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the Defense Law-
yer's Conflicting Ethical Obligations to the Court and to His Client, 59 DEN. U.L. REV.
75, 79 n.29 (1981).
41. Id. at 79.
42. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conkference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159,
1160 (1958).
43. See CALIFORNIA RULES supra note 1, Rule 1-100.
44. CODE, supra note 38, preliminary statement.
45. It should be noted that only the D.R. have mandatory effect. The Canons and
Ethical Considerations are merely advisory. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at D.R. 4-101(B) (emphasis added). This duty is also imposed upon Califor-
nia attorneys. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1974 & Supp. 1987). See CODE,
supra note 38, D.R. 4-101 n.1l.
48. CODE, supra note 38, D.R. 4-101(A).
49. Id.
50. While the attorney-client privilege involves information gained by the attorney
[Vol. 15: 65, 1987] Mandatory Disclosure of Client Perjury
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
The duty to maintain the confidences and secrets of the client set
forth in the Code is far from absolute. While the drafters' respect for
the attorney's obligation to maintain the confidentiality of client con-
versations is clear, there are several exceptions to this rule in the
Code.51 D.R. 4-101(C) provides that an attorney may reveal the con-
fidential information of his client if the client consents to such disclo-
sure,52 when disclosure is required by law,53 or when to do so is
necessary in order to collect attorney's fees. 54 The most troublesome
exception to the attorney's duty of confidentiality under D.R. 4-
101(C), however, is the future-crimes exception.55
It has been argued that the future-crimes exception places a
mandatory obligation upon the attorney to reveal client's intentions
to commit perjury.56 A number of scholars, however, have taken an
opposite position, arguing that this exception should be narrowly con-
strued against disclosure.57 In spite of the conflicting views sur-
rounding the meaning of D.R. 4-101(C), it must be recognized that
this section is permissive rather than mandatory.58 Although it may
be argued that an attorney ought to reveal to the court any confiden-
tial information necessary to prevent the client from committing per-
jury, there is nothing in D.R. 4-101(C)(3) to suggest that mandatory
disclosure is required.59
The only section in the Code that requires the attorney to disclose
pursuant to pending litigation, the ethical duties of confidentiality include information
which is not necessarily protected under the attorney-client privilege-for example, in-
formation conveyed in the presence of other persons. As a result, the attorney cannot
simply rely upon the court's interpretation of the attorney-client privilege in defining
the scope and circumstances under which the ethical obligation of confidentiality will
be imposed upon the attorney. Id. at E.C. 4.4.
51. CODE, supra note 38, at D.R. 4-101(C)(1-4).
52. Id. at D.R. 4-101(C)(1) (emphasis added).
53. Id. at D.R. 4-101(C)(2).
54. Id. at D.R. 4-101(C)(4).
55. Id. at D.R. 4-101(C)(3). D.R. 4-101(C)(3) reads: "A lawyer may reveal:... (3)
the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent
the crime." Id.
56. Lazarus, Book Review, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 348, 355 n.25 (1976). Contra, Wolf-
ram, supra note 3, at 865-66. See also, ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op.
314 (1965) (holding that in dealings with the Internal Revenue Service, the lawyer is
under an ethical duty, upon discovery of illegal behavior by the client, to withdraw
from service or disclose the client's intent as per Canon 15).
57. Erickson, supra note 40, at 81 (attorney need not disclose client's fraud if dis-
covered via privileged communication).
58. CODE, supra note 38, D.R. 4-101(C). See Callan & David, Professional Respon-
sibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adver-
sary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332, 353 (1976).
59. Callan & David, supra note 58, at 353-55.
information gained on behalf of a client is D.R. 7-102(B)(1).60 Once
the attorney discovers that his client intends to commit a fraud upon
the court, he must disclose all information necessary to prevent this
crime from occurring.61 This rule was amended in 1974 to exclude all
privileged communication from the disclosure requirement.62 As a
result, the attorney who discovers that his client is about to commit
perjury is required to reveal all nonprivileged information to the
court. However, if the client's illegal intentions are discoverd by way
of confidential information, disclosure is prohibited.
It should be remembered that the attorney's duty of confidentiality
under the Code is defined more broadly than the statutory privilege.
Thus, even though the information gained might not be considered
confidential under the statutory attorney-client privilege, the Disci-
plinary Rules contained in the Code might nevertheless demand
confidentiality.
The Code does not adequately resolve the conflicts which result if
the only information the attorney has acquired is privileged.63 Under
the Code, it seems clear that disclosure is forbidden.64 The Commit-
tee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility65 has declared that the
60. CODE, supra note 38, D.R. 7-102(B)(1). This Disciplinary Rule holds that once
the attorney becomes aware that his client has committed a fraud upon the court, he is
directed to reveal any relevant, nonprivileged information to the court.
61. Id. Note that until the Code was amended in 1974, D.R. 7-102(B)(1) did not
exempt privileged communication from an attorney's duty to disclose frauds commit-
ted against the court. As a result, a great deal of conflict existed between supporters
of the attorney-client privilege and those championing the ethical obligation of disclo-
sure. Callan & David, supra note 58, at 360. It should be noted that several states
which adopted the Code did not accept the 1974 amendments. See generally supra
note 39. See also Wolfram, supra note 3, at 865 n.218. After 1974, however, attorneys
were only required to disclose nonprivileged communications. Once the attorney con-
cluded that the nature of the communication was privileged, he could not reveal it to
the court even to prevent the client from committing perjury. Callan & David, supra
note 58, at 360-62. Cf Los Angeles County Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics, Opinion
267 (1960) (misappropriation of funds).
62. Callan & David, supra note 58, at 360.
63. For an exhaustive elaboration on the ineffectiveness of the Code to provide ad-
equate guidelines to attorneys confronted with client perjury, see Dunetz, supra note 4,
at 410-20. See also Wright, The Code of Professional Responsibility: Its History and
Objectives, 24 ARK. L. REV. 1 (1970); Note, Client Fraud and the Lawyer-An Ethical
Analysis, 62 MINN. L. REV. 89, 105 (1977). See generally Note, The Attorney's Duty to
Reveal a Client's Intended Future Criminal Conduct, 1984 DUKE L.J. 582.
64. CODE, supra note 38, D.R. 4-101(B)(1), 4-101(C)(3), 7-102(B). See ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975) (explaining the 1974
amendment precluding from the duty to reveal client perjury the confidential informa-
tion of the client). See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, In-
formal Op. 1314 (1975) (holding that an attorney's duty to maintain the confidentiality
of privileged communication supersedes duty to reveal client's perjury); ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1318, 1320 (1975) ("It is the
opinion of the Committee that you [an attorney] have a primary duty to protect the
confidentiality of any privileged communication from your client.").
65. In 1913, the Standing Committee on Professional Ethics of the American Bar
Association was established in order to make recommendations concerning areas
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proper course of action for an attorney confronted with a client insis-
tent upon committing perjury is to withdraw from the case.6 6 This
opinion reflects the Ethics Committee's tendency to preserve the con-
fidentiality of the attorney-client relationship even at the risk of the
presentation of false testimony. But while withdrawing from the
case may be an appropriate solution in some instances, it may not be
appropriate in others.67 Thus, the Code cannot be said to be a suffi-
cient standard under all circumstances where client perjury is
present.
B. The American Bar Association Defense Function Standards68
The ABA Defense Function Standards Relating to the Administra-
tion of Criminal Justice (Defense Function Standards) were drafted
as part of an ABA effort to provide guidance to practicing criminal
defense attorneys in specific areas of ethical behavior.6 9 The Defense
Function Standards were adopted by the ABA House of Delegates in
1971 to be applied in conjunction with the Code.7o Though these
standards are offered purely as guidelines, 7 1 they provide an alterna-
tive course of action for the criminal defense attorney.
Defense Function Standard 4-7.5(a) 7 2 states that it is "unprofes-
sional conduct" for an attorney to offer false evidence to the courts.7 3
which the Code addressed. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, In-
troduction, 1 (1985). The Committee opined as to what the Code was designed to cover.
After several changes in the Committee in 1971, it was renamed the Standing Commit-
tee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility. Id. at 2. Its purpose has not changed
much. It is to "express its opinion on proper professional or judicial conduct, either on
its own initiative or when requested to do so by a member of the bar .... " ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal and Informal Ethics Op. 1, 2-
3 (1985). While only advisory in nature, these opinions have strong persuasive influ-
ence concerning the interpretation of these rules. Id.
66. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility Informal Op. 1318
(1975). It should be noted that when the ABA adopted the Model Rules, it shifted its
position to require mandatory disclosure of client perjury. See Standing Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility Formal Op. 84-349 (1984).
67. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
68. ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(approved by the American Bar Association House of Delegates in 1979) [hereinafter
Defense Function Standards].
69. Wolfram, supra note 3, at 824.
70. Id.
71. Defense Function Standards, supra note 68, Standard 4-1.1(f). ABA Defense
Function Standard 4-1.1(f) states that, "These standards are not intended as criteria for
the judicial evaluation of alleged misconduct of counsel to determine the validity of a
conviction ......
72. Id. Standard 4-7.5(a).
73. Id.
This section, however, is rather general,74 and fails to directly ad-
dress the issue of the disclosure of confidential information.
Defense Function Standard 4-7.7, however, focuses specifically
upon client perjury.75 The section provides detailed steps for a de-
fense attorney to take when confronted with a client about to commit
perjury in his own defense. First, the attorney is to persuade the cli-
ent not to testify falsely.7 6 If this is ineffective, the attorney may
move for withdrawal from the* case but is precluded from revealing to
the court the reasons for withdrawal. 77 If withdrawal is denied, "it is
unprofessional conduct for the lawyer to lend aid to the perjury or
use the perjured testimony."7 8 The attorney is to allow the defend-
ant to take the stand and to testify.79 The attorney should, however,
make a record of the fact that the client is testifying against the
wishes of the attorney, but must do so without revealing to the court
the reasons for the attorney's disagreement.8 0 The attorney may not
reveal the false testimony to the court and is prohibited from arguing
or otherwise supporting this evidence.81 Instead, the attorney must
conduct direct examination of the client while avoiding questions
which might result in the presentation of false evidence. Following
this examination, he must allow the client to give narrative testi-
mony.8 2 In closing argument, the attorney may not make reference
to this false evidence but may otherwise advocate his client's case.
Although this guideline provides the attorney with a definite, concise
course of action, it may not be very practical.
The Defense Function Standards are not a practical solution to the
problem of client perjury because they preclude the attorney from
taking any steps, beyond persuasion, to prevent this false evidence
from being presented to the court.8 3 If the attorney is unsuccessful
in dissuading the client from taking the stand to commit perjury, the
attorney must withdraw from the case. Even if his motion to with-
draw is granted, however, there will always be another attorney ap-
74. Wolfram, supra note 3, at 825-26. It should be noted that the ABA Standing
Committee disapproved this approach. See infra note 121, at 8. Note also that the
ABA House of Delegates refused to adopt Standard 4-7.7 in 1979. Id. § 8 n.10,
75. Defense Function Standards, supra note 68, Standard 4-7.7.
76. Id. Standard 4-7.7(a).
77. Id. Standard 4-7.7(b).
78. Id. Standard 4-7.7(c).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. The ABA had denounced this course of conduct. See supra note 64. It
should be noted that states are free to adopt this plan if thdy desire.
82. Id. See generally Sampson, Client Perjury: Truth, Autonomy, and the Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyer, 9 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 387, 398 (1981).
83. Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978). See also Comment, supra
note 39, at 499 (1983); for a discussion of this issue see Comment, Responding to the
Criminal Defense Client Who Insists on the Presentation of Perjuring Nonparty Wit-
nesses: The Schultheis Solution, 68 IOWA L. REV. 359 (1983). ,
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pointed as counsel. This attorney may be unaware of the client's
intent to commit perjury. Moreover, there is every reason to believe
that the client will learn from his attorney's reluctance to allow false
testimony and will become more adept in the presentation of per-
jured testimony.
On the other hand, if the attorney is unsuccessful in withdrawing
from the case, this passive narrative approach may be just as undesir-
able. First, it is likely that judges and sophisticated jurors will be-
come aware of the fact that the client is giving testimony from the
apparent lack of support of the attorney. This situation will become
even more acute in closing arguments when the attorney fails to ad-
dress the perjured testimony. Judges familiar with the Defense
Function Standards, and bright jurors will likely suspect that the cli-
ent's testimony is not wholly truthful.8 4
Another problem with this approach is that the prosecution will
probably object to the narrative testimony since it precludes the rais-
ing of timely objections.8 5 The prosecutor may also object on the
ground that there is no question pending. This would force the de-
fense attorney to ask a series of questions. Under these circum-
stances, the attorney would be unable to avoid participating in the
fraud. For these reasons, the standards do not provide a viable alter-
native approach for the attorney who does not want to participate in
the presentation of false evidence to the court, but who also seeks to
uphold his duty to his client.86 Although these standards provide an
avenue by which the attorney can avoid prosecution or discipline,8 7
they do nothing to preserve the integrity of the court. It would seem
more consistent with our concept of ordered justice for a system of
rules governing the conduct of defense attorneys to promote truthful
fact-finding rather than allow its perversion.
It has been argued that imposing a duty upon the attorney to dis-
close any false evidence the client presents to the court would not
84. McCall, Nix v. Whiteside: The Lawyer's Role in Response to Perjury, 13 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 443, 469 (1986).
85. Id. at 469-70 n.109. But note that the trial court does have the discretion to
allow this type of testimony if appropriate. FED. R. EVID. 611.
86. Defense Function Standards, supra note 68, Standard 4-7.4(a-c). Note that no-
where in these guidelines is the attorney required to prevent the client from giving
perjured testimony.
87. While there are few cases where the court has allowed an attorney to be prose-
cuted for passive participation in fraud, this scenario remains a possibility. McCall,
supra note 84, at 461.
promote truthful fact-finding.88 Compelling the attorney to evaluate
the evidence presented by his client and to screen out any false evi-
dence, puts the attorney in the position of the finder of fact. In the
adversarial process, the jury is the fact-finder.8 9 It fulfills this func-
tion by examining all admissible evidence for trustworthiness.90 It is
presumed that the collective evaluation of the evidence by an impar-
tial panel of jurors will yield an unbiased decision. It is the impartial
character of the jury that makes it the most effective body for the
evaluation of evidence. When the evidence is presented to the jury
by two adversarial parties, it is presumed that the truth will emerge.
However, compelling an attorney to withhold certain evidence from
the jury that is determined by the attorney to be false serves to dis-
rupt this adversarial process. The attorney is not an unbiased party
and will be unable to make an impartial evaluation of the truthful-
ness of the evidence. Furthermore, since he is subject to sanction by
the Bar for allowing false evidence through to the jury,91 he will
have the incentive to strictly construe all the evidence. As a result,
some evidence which would otherwise go to the jury may be unjusti-
fiably withheld by the attorney. It may be concluded that under a
rule of mandatory disclosure the advocate is placed in a position
where the jury's fact-finding function is usurped.
By establishing clear guidelines for the attorney to follow, the De-
fense Function Standards aim at ensuring that the roles of the vari-
ous players within the adversarial process are clearly defined.92
These standards also help ensure that the players remain within
their respective roles.93 The drafters argue that the result of all this
is that the truth is more likely to be revealed.94
Concern has been focused upon the implications of mandatory dis-
closure rules. Is the risk so slight, and the likelihood juries will not
be able to determine the trustworthiness of evidence so great, that
we should be willing to grant to attorneys the power to deny juries
the chance to evaluate all the evidence? Do we have no confidence in
88. See irnfra Freedman, supra note 196, at 1063-64.
89. Grady, Nix v. Whiteside: Client Perjury and the Criminal Justice System: The
Defendant's Position, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1985); Robinson, The Perjury Di-
lemma in an Adversary System, 82 DICK. L. REV. 545, 552-53 (1978).
90. Robinson, supra note 89, at 552-53.
91. In re King, 7 Utah 2d 258, 262, 322 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1958). An attorney who
passively allows his client to give false evidence to the court may be subject to prosecu-
tion. The above case indicates that there is a possibility of such prosecution. See Mc-
Call, supra note 84, at 461. But see 575 F.2d at 731 (stating "a passive refusal to lend
aid to what is believed to be perjury in accordance with the Defense Function Stan-
dards would [not] violate due process" of the defendant).
92. Defense Function Standards, supra note 68, Standard 4-7.7(c).
93. Id.
94. For an overview discussion of this passive narrative approach and the
problems it presents, see Dunetz, supra note 4, at 443.
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the ability of the prosecutor to find discrepancies in the testimony of
witnesses and to expose these on cross-examination? If we are to
make attorneys responsible for presenting only truthful testimony,
are we not putting them in the role of the prosecutor, investigating
his client's story and presenting it at trial as truthful? If so, there is
a strong likelihood that if the attorney fails to discover false evi-
dence, and it is presented to the court, this false evidence will be
given more credibility than if the attorney was not responsible for its
veracity. 95 In light of these compelling concerns, the Association of
Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) takes the position that the de-
fense attorney should never reveal confidential information to the
court.96
C. The Trial Lawyer's Code of Conduct
An alternative means for guidance to the resolution of this ethical
dilemma is found in the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct (Code
of Conduct).97 The Code of Conduct was drafted under the close su-
pervision of Professor Monroe Freedman. Professor Freedman's po-
sition is that the attorney should not reveal confidential
communications occurring between the client and the lawyer.98 Pro-
fessor Freedman reasons that the attorney's duty of confidentiality to
the client is so central to the effective functioning of the adversary
system, that to require the attorney to disclose confidential informa-
tion to the court would materially inhibit the system's truth-finding
function.9 9 Professor Freedman argues that the attorney faced with a
client who insists upon committing perjury ought to allow the de-
fendant to take the stand, give his testimony and argue the testimony
to the jury in the most persuasive manner possible.100 This approach
allows the jury to make the decision whether the testimony is trust-
95. By making the attorney responsible for the truthfulness of such evidence, the
judge and jury will likely give such evidence more weight, depending, of course, on the
reputation of the attorney. Consequently, this false evidence may be considered trust-
worthy and be given more weight than otherwise. The jury should be encouraged to
judge the evidence presented independent of the reputation of the lawyer. To some
degree, this influence of the lawyer is inescapable. But the Bar should avoid com-
pounding this problem by requiring lawyers to be watch-dogs over the conduct of their
clients.
96. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
97. American Lawyer's Code of Conduct (Revised Draft 1982) [hereinafter Code of
Conduct].
98. Freedman, supra note 29, at 1470-74.
99. Id.
100. Robinson, supra note 89, at 552-53.
worthy or not. It also places the attorney in a purely advocative role
and affords the client the greatest amount of loyalty.101
The Code of Conduct obviously gives the duty of confidentiality
great significance. Rule 1.2 of the Code of Conduct prohibits the at-
torney from revealing confidential information, either directly or in-
directly unless under compulsion of law; to avoid appearing before a
corrupted fact-finder; to defend a fellow member of the bar for
charges of misconduct; or to prevent imminent danger to life.1o2 It
should be noted that these exceptions are not likely to appear very
often.
As a guideline, the Code of Conduct falls short of offering a bal-
anced approach between the two competing interests. Instead, the
Code of Conduct amounts to an affirmation of the notion that the at-
torney ought to be a zealous advocate despite the possible harmful ef-
fects the presentation of perjured testimony will have upon the court.
D. American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules)
were adopted in 1983 by the American Bar Association in order to
consolidate the "patchwork amendments" to the Code and to elimi-
nate many of the "gaps" therein which left many questions concern-
ing serious ethical issues unanswered.o 3 The Model Rules were
101. Id. See also supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
102. Code of Conduct, supra note 97, Rule 1.2.
103. Kutak, Final Draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 67 A.B.A. J.
1299, 1301 (1981). The following State Bars have adopted the Model Rules with some
variation: ARIZONA, ARIZ. SuP. CT. R. 42 at 287 (1986) (adopted Aug. 2, 1983) (Rules of
Professional Conduct); ARKANSAS, In the Matter of the Arkansas Bar Ass'n: Petition
for the Adoption of Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 287 Ark. 495, 701 S.W.2d 326
(1985) (effective Jan. 1, 1986); CONNECTICUT, CONN. S.C.R. 508, Desk Copy 1987 (effec-
tive Oct. 1, 1986); DELAWARE, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, supp. at 237 (1986) (the Delaware
Lawyer's Rules of Professional Conduct, effective Oct. 1, 1985); FLORIDA, The Florida
Bar Re: Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, 494 So. 2d 977, 1021 (1986) (Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct) (effective Jan. 1, 1987); IDAHO, IDAHO STATE BAR, Desk Book, § E at 5-
62 (1987) (Rules of Professional Conduct) (effective Nov. 1, 1986); INDIANA, IND. CODE
ANN., Rules of Professional Conduct, 93 (Burns Supp. 1987) (superseding Code, effec-
tive Jan. 1, 1987); MARYLAND, MD. RULES CODE ANN., vol. 2, app. (1987) (The Mary-
land Lawyer's Rules of Professional Conduct) (effective Jan. 1, 1987); MINNESOTA,
MINN. SUP. CT. R. 2, 833 (1987) (Minn. Rules of Professional Conduct) (effective Sept.
1, 1985); MISSISSIPpI, MISS. SuP. CT. R. app., (Miss. Rules of Professional Conduct) (ef-
fective July 1, 1987); MISSOURI, MO. SuP. CT. R. 4 (1987) (Rules of Professional Con-
duct) (effective Jan. 1, 1986); MONTANA, In the matter of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.1-8-8.5 inclusive (effective
July 1, 1985); NEVADA, NEV. REV. STAT. vol. 1 SCR 150 (Model Rules of Professional
Conduct) (effective Mar. 28, 1986); NEW HAMPSHIRE, N.H. CT. R. ANN. 1.1 (effective
Feb. 8, 1986); NEW JERSEY, N.C.R. ANN. (Rules of Professional Conduct) (1987) (effec-
tive Sept. 10, 1984); NEW MEXICO, N.M. STAT. ANN., Judicial Pamphlet 16, (1987)
(Rules of Professional Conduct) (effective Jan. 1, 1987); NORTH CAROLINA, North Caro-
lina Rules of Professional Conduct, 312 N.C. 845 (1985) (as adopted by the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court Oct. 7, 1985); NORTH DAKOTA, N.D. SUP. CT. R., Desk Copy (West
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adopted as a result of the Kutak Commission's comprehensive analy-
sis of the Code in light of the changing law of professional responsi-
bility1o4  But the Model Rules were not only meant to be a
restatement of the law of professional conduct; they were intended to
set out prospective guidelines providing practicing attorneys useful
options and information for the resolution of ethical problems.105
Robert J. Kutak, Chairman of the American Bar Association's Com-
mission on Evaluation of Professional Conduct, noted that in order to
more effectively achieve this goal, the proceedings of the commission
ought to be open to the public.106 Since "[n]o one has a monopoly on
the judgment and insight that such a comprehensive evaluation of
professional standards demands.., anyone who wanted to participate
needed only to ask."107
The Model Rules were drafted with recognition of the many "ethi-
cal tensions engendered by the competing rights and duties involved
in our legal system."1 08 At the same time, the drafters sought to
maintain sensitivity to the various interests competing for favor in
the area of client perjury. This was a very ambitious goal. As Kutak
noted, "[a] client's perjury offers what may be the most cruel di-
lemma an advocate can face."109 In light of these competing inter-
ests-or because of them-the Model Rules offer the attorney a great
deal of discretion to reveal client confidences under circumstances
which the Code would have prohibited.110
The Model Rules express the need and concern for the mainte-
nance of the client's confidence. The comments to Rule 1.6 state: "A
1987) (Model Rules were adopted and became effective Jan. 1, 1988); UTAH, Revised
Rules of Professional Conduct of the Utah State Bar (i985) 54A Utah Advance Report
11 (1987) (effective Jan. 1, 1988, pending -Supreme Court approval); WASHINGTON,
WASH. R. CT. pt. 1 (i987), (Rules of Professional Conduct); WISCONSIN, WIS. S.C.R. 20
(1987) (effective Jan. 1, 1988); WYOMING, WYO. CT. R. ANN., Rules for Professional
Conduct (Michie Supp. 1987) (effective Jan. 12, 1987).
104. Id. See generally The Legislative History of The Model Rules of Professional
Conduct: Their Development in the A.B.A. House of Delegates, CENTER FOR PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, A.B.A. (1987).
105. Kutak, supra note 103, at 1301.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Kutak, Coming: The New Model Rule of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A. J. 47,
48 (1980).
109. Id. at 49.
110. Dunetz, supra note 4, at 432. It should be noted that Charles Wolfram has ar-
gued that the Model Rules require mandatory disclosure of client perjury. C. WOLF-
RAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 659 (1986). Wolfram argues that Rule 3.3 contains
mandatory language sufficient to impose an affirmative duty to disclose client perjury.
See infra note 115.
fundamental principle in the client-lawyer relationship is that the
lawyer maintain confidentiality of information relating to the repre-
sentation."i"i This desire to preserve confidentiality is believed to fa-
cilitate "the full development of facts essential to proper
representation of the client" as well as encourage clients to seek legal
advice early.112 The Model Rules view confidentiality as a necessary
component of the truth-seeking machine. But the Model Rules also
recognize that this need for confidentiality is not absolute. Rule
1.6(b) gives the attorney the discretion to reveal otherwise confiden-
tial communications when to do so would "prevent the client from
committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result
in imminent death or substantial bodily harm" to another, or in order
to defend oneself in court against an action brought by the former
client.113 Furthermore, the comments to Rule 1.6(b) specifically di-
rect the attorney to Rule 3.3(a)(4), which deals with client perjury.11 4
Rule 3.3(a)(4) essentially provides that since the lawyer is forbid-
den from knowingly offering false evidence to the court, once the
lawyer is confronted with or discovers that such evidence has been
111. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.6. The Rule states:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a cli-
ent unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures
that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation,
and except as stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reason-
ably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily
harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a contro-
versy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct
in which the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any
proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
Id.
112. Id. at comment, para. 2.
113. Id. at Rule 1.6(b)(1) (emphasis added).
114. Id. at comment, para. 10. Rule 3.3 comment 11 reads:
Remedial Measures
[11] If perjured testimony or false evidence has been offered, the advo-
cate's proper course ordinarily is to demonstrate with the client confidentially.
If that fails, the advocate should seek to withdraw if that will remedy the situ-
ation. If withdrawal will not remedy the situation or is impossible, the advo-
cate should make disclosure to the court. It is for the court then to determine
what should be done-making a statement about the matter to the trier of
fact, ordering a mistrial or perhaps nothing. If the false testimony was that of
the client, the client may controvert the lawyer's version of their communica-
tion when the lawyer discloses the situation to the court. If there is an issue
whether the client has committed perjury, the lawyer cannot represent the
client in resolution of the issue and a mistrial may be unavoidable. An un-
scrupulous client might in this way attempt to produce a series of mistrials
and thus escape prosecution. However, a second such encounter could be con-
strued as a deliberate abuse of the right to counsel and as such a waiver of the
right to further representation.
Id. at comment, 11.
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presented to the court, "the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial
measures." 115 The comments to the Rule provide three such meas-
ures." 6 First, the lawyer is directed to try to persuade the client to
reveal to the court the fact that such evidence is false, or in some way
to eliminate the taint that the presentation of such evidence may
have on the fact-finder."17 If this attempt at persuasion is ineffective,
the lawyer is required to attempt to withdraw from the case.11 8 If
this option is inappropriate or otherwise unavailable, then the lawyer
should disclose to the court the evidence the lawyer believes to be
false, and allow the judge to determine what to do.119
Under the Model Rules, the disclosure of client perjury is clearly
mandatory.120 The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Profes-
sional Responsibility has declared that the adoption of Model Rule
3.3 represented a major change in the ABA's position with respect to
the attorney's duty when the client seeks to or has committed per-
jury.121 "It is now mandatory, under these Model Rule provisions,
115. Id. at Rule 3.3(a)(4) (emphasis added)., Rule 3.3, Candor Toward the Tribunal,
states:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is neces-
sary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling ju-
risdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position
of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel; or
(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has of-
fered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer
shall take reasonable remedial measures.
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the pro-
ceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information
otherwise protected by rule 1.6.
(c) A lawyer may refuse to offer evidence that the lawyer reasonably be-
lieves is false.
(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all mate-
rial facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an
informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.
MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 3.3.
116. Id. at comment 11. See supra note 114 (full text of comment 11).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. There is, however, some question as to whether disclosure of client fraud is
mandated by the Model Rules. Dunetz, supra note 4, at 432. See also ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1318 (1975).
121. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 87-353
(1981) (Lawyer's Responsibility with Relation to Client Perjury). This opinion deals
specifically with the situation in which the client has presented false evidence and re-
fuses to disclose such information, compounded by the fact that the court refuses to
allow the lawyer to withdraw.
for a lawyer, who knows the client has committed perjury, to disclose
this knowledge to the tribunal .... ."122 The Committee determined
that Rule 3.3, read as a whole, required the disclosure of perjury de-
spite the fact that this evidence was otherwise confidential. The
Committee determined that Rule 3.3(b) expressly made Rule
3.3(a)(2) and (4) supersede Rule 1.6.123 Although this mandatory ap-
proach may very well put some lawyers at odds with their own moral
feelings on this issue, alternate means are available by which they
might resolve their personal moral convictions. 124
The Model Rules do not resolve all the ethical issues surrounding
client perjury. By rejecting the "participation approach" offered by
the ATLA Code of Conduct and the "passive accommodation" of the
Defense Function Standards as an inadequate resolution of the prob-
lem, the Model Rules go a long way toward providing a meaningful
and workable standard. However, it should be noted that the Model
Rules contain several limiting features. For instance, Model Rule
3.3(a) is subordinate to the constitutional rights of the defendant/cli-
ent.125 Therefore, if presented with an ethical dilemma, the resolu-
tion of which could result in the violation of the client's
constitutional rights, disclosure by the attorney may be prohibited
under the Model Rules.126 Furthermore, the Model Rules require
122. Id. at 4.
123. Id. at 5.
124. The attorney could, for example, inform the client at the beginning of the rep-
resentation that all false evidence given to the court will be immediately disclosed to
the court by the lawyer. In this way, the attorney whose moral convictions preclude
him from allowing false evidence to be presented to the court, can forewarn his client
of his moral predisposition. Furthermore, the attorney could draft a contract to this
effect. The California Court of Appeals has held that a client may waive the attorney-
client privilege by contract, thereby allowing the attorney to disclose such information
to the court. The court further held that this contract may also alleviate the lawyer's
duty under the Ethical Codes of Conduct. See Roberts v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 330,
344, 508 P.2d 309, 317, 107 Cal. Rptr. 309, 317 (1973). See also Maas v. Municipal Court
(Sully), 175 Cal. App. 3d 601, 606, 221 Cal. Rptr. 245, 248 (1986). See generally MODEL
RULES, supra note 5, at Rule 3.3 and 3.3(a)(4). See also Comment, Lying Clients and
Legal Ethics: The Attorney's Unresolved Dilemma, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 487, 505 n.177
(1983).
125. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 3.3, comment 12. The comment, "Constitu-
tional Requirements," reads:
[12] The general rule-that an advocate must disclose the existence of per-
jury with respect to a material fact, even that of a client-applies to defense
counsel in criminal cases, as well as in other instances. However, the defini-
tion of the lawyer's ethical duty in such a situation may be qualified by consti-
tutional provisions for due process and the right to counsel in criminal cases.
In some jurisdictions these provisions have been construed to require that
counsel present an accused as a witness if the accused wishes to testify, even if
counsel knows the testimony will be false. The obligation of the advocate
under these Rules is subordinate to such a constitutional requirement.
Id.
126. Id. This is not to suggest that rules requiring disclosure would not have simi-
lar constraints, but rather that the issue cannot be easily decided by any set of ethical
rules. The rules of conduct in this area cannot be expected to resolve all of the ethical
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disclosure only in cases where the lawyer "knows" the evidence is
false.' 27 Therefore, it seems logical that in circumstances in which
the attorney has some doubt as to the falsity of the evidence, disclo-
sure would be prohibited. This is significant since there will almost
always be some degree of doubt as to the truth or falsity of any evi-
dence obtained from the client.128 As a result, the Model Rules may
not be able to resolve every ethical issue which arises when the client
seeks to present perjured testimony to the court.
E. California Rules of Professional Conduct
The 1975 California Rules of Professional Conduct 29 were last
amended in 1983 and have retained much of the language borrowed
from the American Bar Association's Canons of Ethics.130 California
Rule 7-105(1) provides that the lawyer shall "[e]mploy, for the pur-
pose of maintaining the causes confided to him such means only as
are consistent with the truth . "..."131 But there is no affirmative
issues confronting attorneys in all situations where a client seeks to present false evi-
dence to the court.
It should also be noted that several courts have held that disclosure of client perjury
would not be a violation of the client's constitutional rights. In McKissick v. United
States, 379 F.2d 754, 761 (5th Cir. 1967), the court held that perjury was a continuing
crime "so long as [it was] allowed to remain in the record to influence the jury's ver-
dict." Id. See Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429, 437-38, cert. denied, 429 United
States 1024 (1976) (holding that the criminal defendant's due process rights were not
violated when his attorney followed the ABA Defense Function Standard 7.7). See
also State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 237, 468 P.2d 136, 141 (1970) (holding that there
was no violation of client's confidentiality when attorney disclosed to court the client's
intent to commit perjury).
127. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, at Rule 3.3(a). The Rule begins: "A lawyer shall
not knowingly .. " Id. (emphasis added). See generally C. WOLFRAM, supra note 110,
at 655-56.
128. Grady, supra note 93, at 8. Grady argues that the issue of whether the lawyer
has sufficient knowledge to conclude that a client will commit perjury is "a mixed
question of law or fact to which the presumption of correctness does not apply." Id.
Under the facts of Nix, Grady argues that there was insufficient evidence for the attor-
ney to conclude that the client was about to commit perjury. Id. See also Nix v.
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). But see Appel & McGrave, Nix v. Whiteside: Client
Perjury and the Criminal Justice System: The State's Position, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
19, 22 n.43 (1985) ("Whiteside told his lawyers that he intended to testify falsely on the
stand at his upcoming trial."). But see, ABA Formal Op. 87-353, supra note 121, at 9.
The Committee held that under the Model Rules "the lawyer can no longer rely on
the narrative approach to insulate the lawyer from a charge of assisting the client's
perjury." Id.
129. CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 1.
130. Wolfram, supra note 3, at 823.
131. CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 1, Rule 7-105. The Rule, "Trial Conduct,"
reads:
In presenting a matter to a tribunal a member of the State Bar shall: (1) Em-
duty to disclose false evidence to the court.132 Instead, the California
Rules provide only that the attorney should, and under some circum-
stances must, withdraw from the case.133 California Rule 2-111(B)(2)
provides that the attorney is under a mandatory duty to withdraw
from the case if it becomes apparent that continued representation
would result in a violation of a Rule of Professional Conduct.134
Therefore, if the attorney discovers that the client intends to, or has,
committed perjury, the lawyer must petition the court for removal
from the case, since continued representation would violate Califor-
nia Rule 7-105(1).135
There are several reasons why this "bail-out approach" is inappro-
priate. First, the attorney cannot make the decision to withdraw uni-
laterally-permission to withdraw must be obtained from the
court.136 As a result, withdrawal may simply be unavailable. But
more importantly, the attorney's withdrawal from the case does
nothing to preclude the false evidence from being introduced to the
court.137 Furthermore, even if withdrawal is obtained, it is reason-
able to assume that a dishonest client will learn that if he wishes to
get away with perjury in court, he must not disclose to the suc-
ceeding attorneys the fact that he intends to present false evidence.
Thus, by withdrawing, the attorney may actually facilitate the cli-
ent's efforts to commit a fraud upon the court. This is no solution to
the problem of client perjury and the result is, in fact, detestable.
The source of the various duties of California attorneys is the Cali-
fornia statutes. But these statutes fail to provide adequate guidelines
or the necessary clarity that the perjury dilemma demands. As such,
there is a clear need for a California Rule that would provide ade-
quate guidance for attorneys faced with this ethical problem.
IV. 1987 PROPOSED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
The 1987 Proposed Rules, as currently drafted, would significantly
alter the California Rules of Professional Conduct. Virtually every
ploy, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him such means
only as are consistent with truth, and shall not seek to mislead the judge, judi-
cial officer or jury by an artifice or false statement of fact or law ....
Id.
132. Wolfram, supra note 3, at 823.
133. CALIFORNIA RULES, supra note 1, Rule 2-111(B). The Rules provide an elabo-
rate procedure allowing the attorney to withdraw from the case when the attorney
should know that his continued employment will result in violation of these Rules of
Professional Conduct. Id.
134., Id.
135. Id. Rule 7-105(1) prevents an attorney from misleading a court with false
statements.
136. For a discussion of the issues surrounding mandatory withdrawal, see Wolf-
ram, supra note 3, at 854-62. See also McCall, supra note 84, at 466, 469.
137. McCall, supra note 84, at 469.
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California Rule has been modified in some manner and no less than
six new rules have been added.138 The Commission's comprehensive
evaluation and revision of the California Rules specifically concen-
trated on areas of conflict between the attorney and client.139 One
such area of concentration was that of the attorney's duty of candor
to the court and the client's expectation of attorney confidentiality.
The subcommittee originally drafted Proposed Rule 4-10214o in or-
138. 1987 Proposed Rules, supra note 6, pt. III, at 1-2. At least six new rules were
added: Rule 1-110, 2-200, 3-320, 3-500, 3-600, and 4-400.
139. 1986 Proposed Rules, supra note 8, at pt. III (History of Commission
Consideration).
140. Id. Rule 4-102, at 27. The 1986 Proposed Rule, "Duty to Maintain Client Con-
fidence and Secrets Inviolate," reads as follows:
(A) Is it the duty of a member to maintain inviolate the confidence, and, at
ever peril to himself or herself, to preserve the secrets of a client.
(B) Definitions
(1) As used in this rule, "confidence" means any information, advice or
a legal opinion communicated between a member of a law firm or a
client or prospective client.
(2) As used in this rule, "secrets" means any information obtained by
the member during the professional relationship, or relating to the
representation, which the client has requested to be held inviolate
or the disclosure of which might be embarrassing or detrimental to
the client.
(C) A member may reveal a confidence or secret:
(1) with the consent of the client; or
(2) upon the lawful order of a tribunal and after the member has as-
serted all relevant privileges of the client or former client and has
given the earliest reasonable notice of such order to the client or
former client to permit him or her to protect such confidence or se-
cret; or
(3) to the extent the member reasonably believes necessary:
(a) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
member believes is likely to result in death or substantial bod-
ily harm; or
(b) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of a member in a con-
troversy between the member and the client, to establish a de-
fense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the member
based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to re-
spond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the mem-
ber's representation of the client.
(D) Except where disclosure is otherwise permitted by this rule, a member
shall not:
(1) use a confidence or secret of a client or former client to the disad-
vantage of the client; or
(2) use a confidence or secret of a client for the advantage of the mem-
ber or of a third person, provided that a member may make use of
work product secrets, if that is done without disclosing the client's
identity or the nature of the professional engagement for the client.
(E) When a member comes to know beyond a reasonable doubt that material
evidence offered to a tribunal by the member on behalf of a client is
false, the member shall confidentially exhort the client to permit the
correction of the false evidence. If the client refuses to permit such cor-
der to establish the parameters of the protection to be afforded to cli-
ent confidences and secrets, and to clarify the attorney's duty to his
client as well as to the court.1 41 Proposed Rule 4-102 was adopted in
large part by COPRAC. 1987 Proposed Rule 3-100 incorporated sec-
tions A-D of Proposed Rule 4-102 verbatim, but did not include sec-
tion E requiring mandatory disclosure of client perjury.J42
A. Client Confidences and Secrets
1987 Proposed Rule 3-100 defines the attorney's duty to maintain
the confidences and secrets of his client. Under the 1975 California
Rules, the duty of confidentiality was not clearly defined and the
duty is only briefly mentioned in the California statutes. 143 Rule 3-
100, however, contains a comprehensive definition of attorney-client
communications which constitute "confidences," and which are there-
fore protected from disclosure by the attorney. 44 The Commission's
comments concerning this proposed rule note that this rule "repre-
sents an attempt to balance the interest the client and legal system
have in maintaining the confidentiality of the attorney-client rela-
tionship against the counterbalancing interest which may exist with
respect to disclosure of a particular confidence or secret."145
Proposed Rule 3-100 is similar to Disciplinary Rule 4-101, although
subtle differences exist.' 46 Subsection B of the Proposed Rule de-
rection, the member shall disclose the falsity of the evidence to the tri-
bunal, notwithstanding that the facts establishing such falsity are the
confidence or secrets of the client, and shall leave to the tribunal deter-
mination of the appropriate action. Such obligation to disclose shall con-
tinue after termination of the member's professional employment and
until such time as the final judgment or action in such legal proceeding
is no longer subject to direct or collateral attack.
Id.
141. Betzner Conversation, Oct. 7, 1987, supra note 9.
142. COPRAC accepted all but the mandatory language of subsection E. See 1987
Proposed Rules, supra note 6, pt. IV, at 19. 1986 Proposed Rule 4-102 was adopted by
COPRAC in part. Id. (Rule 3-100). Only the disclosure language of subsection E was
abandoned from the 1986 Proposed Rules. The comments to the 1987 Proposed Rules
note that subsection E was the point of much controversy during the comment period
of 1986-87. Id. Rule 3-100 (comments). Although the 1987 Proposed Rules contain
parts A-D of 1986 Proposed Rule 4-102, neither the language making disclosure of cli-
ent perjury mandatory nor the alternative approach offered in the 1986 Discussion
Draft were adopted. Id.
It should be noted that the analysis of Rule 4-102 is also applicable to 1987 Proposed
Rule 3-100. Except for subsection E, these two Rules are identical. Therefore, since
Rule 4-102 was not wholeheartedly adopted by COPRAC, focus will be placed upon
Rule 3-100.
143. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1974 & Supp. 1987).
144. 1986 Proposed Rules, supra note 8, Rule 4-102(B)(1), at 27.
145. Id. Rule 4-102, comment, at 26.
146. Since this Proposed Rule is new to the California Rules and is substantially
similar to D.R. 4-101, a comparison of these two rules is helpful in evaluating the prob-
able impact this proposed rule may have on California attorneys.
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fines "confidences" and "secrets" in much the same way as does the
Code, but with one significant difference. Unlike the Code, the Pro-
posed Rules do not refer to the attorney-client privilege in defining
what amounts to a "confidence." The Proposed Rule merely states
that a "confidence" is "any information, advice, or a legal opinion
communicated between a member or a law firm and a client or pro-
spective client." 147 The Code, however, specifically links the defini-
tion of a confidence to the attorney-client privilege, defining all other
information gained during the relationship as a "secret."148 While
this is only a subtle difference, the effect is to sever the definition of
the duty of confidentiality under the Proposed Rule from the defini-
tion of the attorney-client privilege. 149 As a result, a clear demarca-
tion is established between the attorney's ethical duty of
confidentiality and the definition of privileged communications under
the attorney-client privilege.
In general, the enumerated exceptions to this duty of confidential-
ity, as presented in Proposed Rule 3-100(C), are similar to those
found in the Code (D.R. 4-101(C)), with certain exceptions. The Code
permits the attorney to reveal client confidences in order to prevent
the client from committing a crime, but the Proposed Rules demand
that these criminal acts be of the type reasonably likely to cause
death or substantial bodily harm.15 0 Thus, while it may be argued
that the future-crimes exception under the Code allows attorneys to
reveal the client's intent to commit perjury,151 this argument does
not exist under the Proposed Rules.152
Although 1987 Proposed Rule 3-100 is similar to 1986 Proposed
Rule 4-102, there is one significant difference. Proposed Rule 4-102
contains language in subsection E which calls for the mandatory dis-
147. 1987 Proposed Rules, supra note 6, Rule 3-100(B)(1), at 19.
148. CODE, supra note 38, D.R. 4-101.
149. This is significant in light of the confusion surrounding the court's definition
of the attorney-client privilege. Comment, Extrajudicial Disclosures of Confidential
Communications-A Continuing Dilemma for the Lawyer, 1 J. LEGAL PROF. 93, 97-101
(1976).
150. 1987 Proposed Rules, supra note 6, pt. IV, Rule 3-100(C)(3)(a), at 19. This is
similar to the definition found in the "future-crimes" exception to the duty of confi-
dentiality presented in the Model Rules. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.6(b)(1).
151. Dunetz, supra note 4, at 417-18. See generally Sampson, supra note 82, at 395.
152. Since Proposed Rule 3-100(C) requires that the crime be of the kind reason-
ably likely to cause death or substantial bodily harm and since perjury does not fall
within this description, the Code's future-crimes exception will not apply under the
California Rules. See generally Sampson, supra note 82, at 395. 1987 Proposed Rules,
supra note 6, Rule 3-100(C)(3)(a), at 19.
closure of client perjury.153 Under Proposed Rule 4-102(E), an attor-
ney who has knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt that his client has
committed perjury or has otherwise presented false evidence to the
court, "shall disclose the falsity of the evidence to the tribunal,
notwithstanding that the facts establishing such falsity are confi-
dences or secrets of the client."s4 Subsection E thus mandates that
the attorney reveal all false evidence presented to the court.
Also, even though Rule 3-100 is similar to Rule 4-102, Proposed
Rule 3-100 does not contain any language making the disclosure of
client perjury mandatory.155 In fact, the Commission refused to
adopt proposed Rule 4-102's less restrictive alternative approach to
mandatory disclosure, which called for the members to take "all rea-
sonable steps to remedy the deception" offered to the court.156
Under this approach, the attorney would be required to take affirma-
tive steps to prevent the client from committing perjury.15 7 Presum-
ably, this would at least allow the attorney the discretion to disclose
the perjured testimony to the court. As a result, the attorney who
seeks to maintain his own ethical and moral standards would be al-
lowed to do so without the threat of disciplinary retaliation by the
Board.158
The Commentary to the 1987 Proposed Rules notes that the Com-
mission received strong criticism of the idea of enacting Rule 4-102.159
The Commission received 35 comments focusing upon this Proposed
Rule. While some 80 comments were received concerning Proposed
Rule 7-107,160 and 43 comments concerning Proposed Rule 2-101,161
the controversy generated by Proposed Rule 4-102 was nevertheless
considerable. The Commission noted the existence of the competing
interests facing an attorney whose client intends to commit perjury,
but maintained that "the negative systemic side-effects on the legal
process of a mandatory disclosure rule would be serious .... "162 As a
result, the Commission refused to include the mandatory language of
Proposed Rule 4-102(E).163
153. 1986 Proposed Rules, supra note 8, Rule 4-102(E), at 27 (see supra note 140 for
full text).
154. Id.
155. 1987 Proposed Rule, supra note 6, Rule 3-100, at 19.
156. Id.
157. 1986 Proposed Rule, supra note 8, Rule 4-102, comment, at 26.
158. The inclusion of this "least restrictive alternative" language would give the at-
torney the discretion to reveal confidential information to the court if no other ave-
nues were available. This is similar to the provisions of the Model Rules. See supra
note 115, Rule 3.3 comment 11.
159. 1987 Proposed Rules, supra note 6, pt. V, at 21.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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B. Mandatory Disclosure
The subcommittee sought to impose a duty of full disclosure of cli-
ent perjury on the attorney, and to allow the court to decide how this
evidence should be treated. This amounted to a very bold attempt at
a resolution of one of the most troubling ethical dilemmas con-
fronting the criminal defense attorney.164 In commenting about sub-
section E of Proposed Rule 4-102, the drafters noted that it is "one
way of resolving a conflict which occasionally may arise because of
the duties imposed upon a member by [California] Business and Pro-
fessions Code section 6068(d) and (e)."165
Several limitations to this duty of disclosure are found in the Rule,
however. First, the Rule applies only to situations in which the attor-
ney knows beyond a reasonable doubt that his client has committed
perjury. But because of ambiguities inherent in such testimony, only
in limited situations will the attorney be convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt that the client's testimony is false.166 The requirement of
mandatory disclosure of client confidences may therefore only arise
164. This was not the first time such a proposal has been advocated and proposed to
a Board of Ethics. Judge Marvin E. Frankel, District Judge for the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York, made a similar proposal to the
American Bar Association in 1975. Frankel, The Search For Truth: An Umpired View,
123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031 (1975). In 1974, Judge Frankel introduced his beliefs on the
attorney's duty of candor to the Association's 31st Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lec-
ture in New York City. He noted that "[t]he rules of professional responsibility should
compel disclosures of material facts and forbid material omissions rather than merely
proscribe positive frauds." Id. at 1057. He also proposed requiring disclosure of "any
untrue statement by client or witness or any omission to state a material fact .... " Id.
at 1057-58.
In 1928, the Board of Governors of the California State Bar, pursuant to the provi-
sions of the State Bar Act, submitted for the California Supreme Court's approval a set
of amendments to the California Rules of Professional Conduct. Amendment eighteen
required the attorney to disclose to the court the client's perjured statements. Rules of
Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California, 2 CAL. ST. B.J. 203, 205 (1928). In
commenting about this new proposed rule, Joseph J. Webb, the President of the Bar,
wrote that it was a reaction to the court's disbarment of attorney Hardenbrock for sub-
ornation of perjury. Id. at 206. Webb noted that the interests of society in maintaining
the integrity of the Bar outweighed the interests of the client under these circum-
stances. Id. This rule, however, was rejected. See Rules of Professional Conduct, 3
CAL. ST. B.J. 17, 19 (1928) (note that Rule 18 is not among the rules enacted by the
Supreme Court of California).
165. 1986 Proposed Rules, supra note 8, Rule 4-102(E) at 27.
166. Grady, supra note 86, at 3. See Merton, Confidentiality and the "Dangerous
Patient": Implications of Tarasoff for Psychiatrists and Lawyers, 31 EMORY L.J. 263,
330 (1982). See also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Op. 87-353 at 7 (1987) (lawyer's responsibility with relation to client perjury); United
States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3rd Cir. 1977) (holding that suspi-
cion alone is not enough).
in clear-cut cases of attempted abuse where the client fully admits to
committing perjury.167
Another self-imposing limitation to the mandatory disclosure rule
of subsection E is that the false evidence must have been actually
presented to the court or tribunal before a duty is imposed.168 Thus,
if the attorney discovers that his client intends to commit perjury
before trial, the attorney must consider Proposed Rules 7-101169 and
2-111(B),170 but is precluded from disclosing this confidential infor-
mation to the court until the client has actually testified and
presented false evidence.171
Because of these two limitations, Proposed Rule 4-102(E) requires
mandatory disclosure in only a few selected situations. The narrow
scope of the Rule is evidenced by the fact that it does not adequately
address the situation where the attorney believes, before trial, that
his client intends to commit perjury. In light of these limitations on
the duty of mandatory disclosure, the Rule's impact would not have
been very significant. But despite the limitations, Proposed Rule 4-
102(E) would have at least established a workable guideline for the
167. Absent a complete admission on the part of the client, the attorney will rarely
be certain that his client's testimony is false. Furthermore, once the client discovers
that the attorney must reveal client perjuries and believes that the attorney will do so,
the client will not make this admission. If he believes that the attorney has discovered
sufficient evidence which tends to disprove the client's alibi defense, the client will
likely discharge the attorney before testifying and attempt to conceal this evidence
from the new attorney. The effect of this "educated" client is to preclude the attorney
from discovering sufficient evidence to be certain that client perjury is imminent. The
attorney is thereby not confronted with the ethical dilemma. It rests with the judicial
system to determine whether the defendant is presenting false evidence, and if perjury
is present, to impose appropriate sanctions. It should be noted, however, that even
though mandatory disclosure will not prevent the discovery of perjury, it is a step in
the right direction. Also, it 'removes the attorney from any participation in this
endeavor.
168. 1986 Proposed Rules, supra note 8, Rule 4-102(E), at 27.
169. 1986 Proposed Rule 7-101 deals with the prohibition against the attorney from
advising his client to violate the law. 1986 Proposed Rules, supra note 8, Rule 7-101, at
36. Presumably, the attorney is to take notice that he must not actively participate in
the presentation of such false evidence to the court. Additionally, if the attorney
knows that the client intends to use his legal services to defraud the court, then the
attorney should refrain from accepting employment from the client.
170. 1986 Proposed Rule 2-111(B) concerns the requirement of mandatory with-
drawal. Id. Rule 2-111(B), at 4. "A member representing a client before a tribunal
shall withdraw from employment with the permission of the tribunal if required by its
rules . . . if: . . . (2) [t]he member knows or should know that continued employment
will result in violation of these rules .... Id. (emphasis added). The requirement of
withdrawal is subject to the approval of the court. The court may therefore unilater-
ally decide that due to the pending trial, the attorney's motion to withdraw will be too
prejudicial to the interests of the client. See Dunetz, supra note 4, at 419-20.
171. 1986 Proposed Rules, supra note 8, Rule 4-102(C) (under Proposed Rule 4-
102(C) there are no provisions for the permissive disclosure of false evidence presented
to the court; the only provision within Rule 4-102 which requires or even allows disclo-
sure of confidential information is subsection E).
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attorney confronted with a client who is known to already have per-
jured himself.
V. RELATIVE MERITS OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
A. Integrity of the Legal Profession
The attorney's duty to disclose to the court all false evidence which
has been presented has been supported on the grounds that doing so
helps to gain the respect of the general public.172 Though the merits
of mandatory disclosure have been aggressively debated among schol-
ars and practioners for many years, Professor Samuel D. Thurman173
has argued that "[p]ublic criticism of the legal profession is most stri-
dent when there is belief that truth telling is not uppermost in the
lawyer's code of ethics."' 74 Thurman suggests that requiring attor-
neys to disclose false evidence presented to the court furthers the ju-
dicial process of truth-finding.175 More importantly, this requirement
may increase the public's confidence in the legal profession. As Thur-
man notes, "[i]f the legal profession and its members are looked upon
as dissemblers, distorters who subordinate truth to winning, and as
technicians who answer to but one command, that of their client,
public confidence in lawyers will be found wanting." 176
Retired Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Warren
E. Burger, while a Judge for the United States Court of Appeals,177
characterized the rule prohibiting an attorney from presenting false
172. The California Bar Association has held the view that the integrity of the legal
profession is an important goal in the Bar Association's overall efforts to serve the
public interest. See generally Ridgway, A Message From The President, 2 CAL. ST. B.J.
8, 9 (1927) (discussing the attorney general's obligation to the California Bar and, indi-
rectly, to the public). See also Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and De-
fense Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11 (1966).
173. Samuel D. Thurman is Professor of Law at the University of Utah College of
Law, B.A., 1935, University of Utah; J.D., 1939, Stanford University.
174. Thurman, Limits to the Adversary System: Interests That Outweigh Confiden-
tiality, 5 J. LEGAL PROF. 5, 14 (1980) (this article is the text of Professor Thurman's
address to the Fifth Annual Justice Hugo L. Black Lecture, delivered on March 6,
1980, at the University of Alabama Law School).
175. Though Professor Thurman never actually evaluated the relative benefits that
disclosure would have in finding the ultimate truth, the article's repeated suggestions
that the benefits outweigh any foreseeable costs allow this inference. See generally
Thurman, supra note 174, at 5-19.
176. Id. at 19.
177. Warren Burger was a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals, Washing-
ton, D.C. at the time he wrote his article entitled Standards of Conduct for Prosecu-
tion and Defense Personnel: A Judge's Viewpoint. See Burger, supra note 172. Burger
was appointed to the United States Supreme Court in 1969 by President Nixon.
Though Chief Justice Burger retired from the Bench in 1987, Chief Justice William
evidence to the court as "so basic and fundamental to the integrity of
our system of justice and the legal profession that it can never admit
of any exception, under any circumstances."1 7 8 Burger went on to
comment that, "[n]o pressure on the lawyer can ever justify a know-
ing and conscious departure from this rule."179 Burger viewed the
rule prohibiting the attorney's presentation of false evidence to the
court as the starting point for the discussion of whether client per-
jury ought to be permitted.1 8 0 He felt that to allow the criminal de-
fense attorney to use his client's perjured testimony as a "tool in the
administration of justice overlooks an ancient axiom of the law that
next to having a strong case the best asset of a litigant is to be repre-
sented by a lawyer who has the complete confidence of' the courts
and of his fellow lawyers."181 Burger later argued in Nix v. White-
side that the disclosure of client perjury to the court is "profession-
ally responsible and acceptable ... conduct."18 2
The integrity of the profession, as well as the interests of justice,
would be served best by a blanket rule requiring disclosure of client
perjury. Such a rule would be fortified by the principle that the cli-
ent has no right to present false evidence to the court. Professor
Thurman contends that since the client does not have the right to
present perjured testimony to the court, the attorney should not be
prevented from disclosing his client's wrongdoing once it has been
presented in court.18 3 Thurman notes that while "[a]n accused has a
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel, a right to testify on
his own behalf, a right to refuse to testify, and a privilege of confi-
dential communications with counsel . . . [h]e does not have a consti-
tutional right to commit perjury."184 This argument is further
supported by Justice Burger's opinion in Nix v. Whiteside, where in
dicta he proclaimed that "there is no right whatever-constitutional
or otherwise-for a defendant to use false evidence."1ss The above
arguments are both premised on the concept that if the client has no
right to commit perjury, 8 6 then the legal profession should be for-
Rehnquist is likely to carry on Burger's view. Justice Rehnquist joined Burger's opin-
ion in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
178. Burger, supra note 172, at 12. See infra note 182.
179. Id.
180. Id. He noted that "the purposes and objectives of a system of justice are to
obtain fair and just results by fair and decent methods .... " As a result, "a lawyer
may never, under any circumstances, knowingly present false testimony ... or other-
wise participate in a fraud on the court." Id
181. Id. at 13.
182. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (Chief Justice Burger delivered the opin-
ion of the Court).
183. Thurman, supra note 174, at 15.
184. Id.
185. 475 U.S. at 173.
186. Id. at 169 ("The offense of perjury was a crime recognized at common law and
has been made a felony in most states by statute .... "). Id.
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bidden to further any attempts by the client at introducing this false
evidence.
B. The "Chilling Effect" of Disclosure Rules
While some argue that full disclosure protects the integrity of the
legal profession, others contend that this amounts to a breach of trust
between the attorney and client. Jerome Sapiro, Jr., former Chair-
man of the San Francisco Bar Association's Legal Ethics Committee,
argued that even the rather limited disclosure requirements under
the Model Rules would be destructive to the attorney-client relation-
ship.18 7 He suggests that imposing any disclosure requirements will
lead to the necessity of giving "Miranda warnings" to clients at the
initial conference, and that this would in turn cause an immediate
distrust of the attorney by the client.188
It has also been argued that this resultant distrust would serve to
reduce the integrity of the legal profession.18 9 The disclosure re-
quirement demonstrates a lack of confidence in the ability of the ju-
dicial system to discover the truth despite attempts to corrupt the
system.190 Sidney Rosdeitcher, Chairman of the New York City Bar
Committee, warned that:
If a lawyer can go out and tell, it would seriously undermine the trust placed
by clients in their lawyers .... You may find you are creating an adversary
relationship between lawyer and client. To the extent that society's interests
are served, there are other means of discovery rather than turning the lawyer
into a policeman. There would be a terrible social loss in chilling that [attor-
ney-client] relationship.191
The strongest argument against a mandatory disclosure rule fo-
cuses upon the impact such a rule would have on the attorney's abil-
ity to gain sensitive information from the client. Rosdeitcher warns
that such a rule would have a "chilling effect" upon the attorney-cli-
ent relationship, since clients will feel less secure about telling the at-
torney the "whole" story,192 possibly disrupting the entire adversary
process.
In response to this argument, Professor Thurman points out that
there are no empirical studies evaluating the degree to which a strict
187. Are Lawyers Balking at True Self-Regulation?, 66 A.B.A. J. 544, 545 (1980).
188. Id.
189. "Lawyer as Cop" Rule May Face Trimming, 66 A.B.A. J. 438 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Lawyer as Cop]. See generally Sampson, supra note 82, at 403.
190. Lawyer as Cop, supra note 189, at 438.
191. Id.
192. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
rule of confidentiality encourages clients to disclose sensitive infor-
mation to their attorneys. 193 Since the penalty for perjury and the
risk of being caught are slight, the client may decide that it is in his
best interest to withhold incriminating information from the attor-
ney, despite the strict rule of confidentiality. The client may feel
that if the attorney believes the client to be innocent, then he will be
in a better position to argue passionately for the client before the
jury.19 4
Thurman counters this argument by noting that even if the rule of
mandatory disclosure reduces the flow of information from the client
to the attorney, it "is a small price to pay for the reputation thereby
gained, both within and outside the profession that lawyers do honor
their obligation of candor to the court."195 The primary goal of the
judicial process is to uncover the truth, and full disclosure allows the
system to more effectively attain this result.
Professor Freedman, however, argues that this emphasis on discov-
ering the truth may be misplaced. While the discovery of the ulti-
mate truth may be an important function of the criminal justice
system, it is argued, the state's interest in the discovery of this truth
is not absolute nor is it even paramount. 196 Under our American sys-
tem of justice, "[t]he dignity of the individual is respected to the
point that even when the citizen is known by the state to have com-
mitted a heinous offense, the individual is nevertheless accorded such
rights as counsel, trial by jury, due process, and the privilege against
self-incrimination."197
Freedman further asserts that in a free society a balance must be
drawn between the interests of the state in protecting its citizens by
gaining the ultimate truth, and the interests of these citizens to be
free from any harmful residual or collateral effects of the state's pur-
suit of its interests.198 To achieve or maintain this balance, each
party must make concessions. The citizens allow the state the neces-
sary latitude to conduct a reasonable investigation of facts while de-
manding at the same time that the parameters of these investigations
be narrowly drawn. The state is further constrained from pursuing
193. Thurman, supra note 174, at 16.
194. This argument has merit considering that clients may not be aware of the sig-
nificance of this sensitive information or be able to realistically evaluate the prosecu-
tion's ability to discover it. As a result, clients who are not familiar with the legal
process will probably not recognize any benefits in disclosure. At the same time, how-
ever, they may be very sensitive to the risks involved if such information were to be-
come public.
195. Thurman, supra note 174, at 16.
196. Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1060, 1063
(1975).
197. Id. at 1063.
198. Id. at 1063-64.
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the absolute truth by the Constitution's protection of each citizen
from self-incrimination. Professor Freedman poses an appropriate
question to illustrate this point: "What more effective way is there to
expose a defendant's guilt than to require self-incrimination at least
to the extent of compelling the defendant to take the stand and re-
spond to interrogation before the jury?"199
Once it is recognized that the pursuit for the truth is not the only
goal of the judicial process, the question then becomes, to what ex-
tent should the scales of justice be readjusted? They may be tilted
either to favor the state's interest in obtaining the truth, or con-
versely, toward the citizen's interest in securing individual freedom.
Freedman argues that the individual's interest is paramount. "[I]n a
society that respects the dignity of the individual, truth-seeking can-
not be an absolute value, but may be subordinated to other ends,
although that subordination may sometimes result in the distortion
of the truth."200
Professor H. Richard Uviller takes the position that mandatory dis-
closure may not be the appropriate solution to the ethical dilemma of
client perjury, and criticizes the mandatory disclosure rule on the
grounds that the "truth" may not always be clearly recognizable. 201
Professor Uviller declares that "the supremacy of Truth is easier to
assert than to define."202 Evidence presented to the court is rarely
unflawed and unambiguous. In recognition of this well established
fact, certain constitutional safeguards have been created in order to
prevent abuses of justice.203 This process is a manifestation of the re-
alization that the truth cannot be discovered in an environmental
vacuum. Rather, the judicial system must wallow in the bog of un-
certainty lying between fact and fiction. The adversary system, how-
ever, was designed with this environment in mind. By pitting one
side against another, the truth or the closest thing that we can expect
thereto, will emerge. Although forceful arguments have been posed
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1065. It should be noted that there is a distinct difference between com-
pelling a defendant to testify against himself and prohibiting an attorney from assist-
ing in the presentation of false evidence. Even recognizing the merit of Professor
Freedman's argument, mandatory disclosure rules do not violate individual rights.
While admitting that these disclosure rules do not prevent client perjury, they do
prevent the attorney from participating in this illegal act.
201. Uviller, The Advocate, The Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge
Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1077 (1975).
202. Id. at 1078.
203. This point was raised earlier in Professor Freedman's argument. See supra
notes 197-200 and accompanying text.
that the duty of confidentiality hinders the truth-finding process, it
has become a "necessary evil" without which the interests of the ac-
cused become increasingly more vulnerable to abuse. As a result, to
the extent that the mandatory disclosure rule would render individu-
als less likely to disclose confidential, sensitive information to the at-
torney, Freedman and others denounce it as a hindrance to the
effectiveness of the adversary process.204
The mandatory disclosure rule has also been criticized as merely
shifting the problem of client perjury from the attorney to the
court.205 As Sampson notes, "If... no judicial action is taken after
counsel's disclosure, an egregious distortion will have been intro-
duced into the truth-seeking process." 206 The effect would likely be
that after client perjury is disclosed, the court will be forced to de-
clare a mistrial. The resultant disruption and delay may be so signifi-
cant as to outweigh any benefits.207 Also, there is always the chance
that the defense will capitalize on the disclosure and delay, either as
a means to gain a mistrial or to delay the trial.208 Thus, it is argued
that, although it may at first seem that the mandatory disclosure rule
would facilitate the truth-finding function of the judicial process, on
closer examination this conclusion becomes unfeasible.
C. Uniform Standards of Conduct
Despite these arguments, the rules requiring mandatory disclosure
of client perjury serve a vital and worthy function. The rules provide
the attorney with a firm set of guidelines. Despite some ambigui-
ties, 20 9 once a falsehood is presented to the court, the attorney's duty
is quite clear.
Furthermore, the rules provide a uniform standard applicable to
all attorneys within the jurisdiction. If a state bar allows attorneys
the discretion to determine whether disclosure is warranted, 21o each
attorney would be able to establish a different standard. This would
produce ambiguity within the legal community as to "the rule" in
204. See generally supra notes 195-99 and accompanying text.
205. Sampson, supra note 82, at 399-400.
206. Id. at 400 (footnote omitted).
207. Id. at 400 n.91. Furthermore, in the rare cases in which such a disclosure rule
would apply, its enforcement would be very difficult if not impossible. Comment, The
Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client, 16 CALIF. L.
REV. 487, 495 (1928).
208. Whether this alternative is realistic is yet to be seen. This strategy may back-
fire on attorneys if the judge decides to disregard the disclosure, continue the trial, and
use the information against the defendant in sentencing.
209. The Rule requires the attorney to disclose evidence believed false beyond a
reasonable doubt. There is ambiguity as to what standard should be applied-the crim-
inal law standard or that of the Model Rules.
210. It has been argued that the Model Rules allow the attorney the discretion to
either disclose or remain silent. See Comment, supra note 39, at 505.
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this area. Mandatory disclosure rules provide much-needed uniform-
ity applicable to all attorneys.
The debate surrounding this issue is focused upon those calling for
absolute confidentiality and those calling for mandatory disclosure.
While the arguments in favor of confidentiality are compelling, they
often result in undesirable results. Under California's Rules (as well
as the 1987 Proposed Rules) the attorney is forbidden to disclose cli-
ent confidences to the court. As a result, if his client has admitted to
committing perjury, the attorney is precluded from disclosing this to
the court. A problem arises, however, in the case where the client
admits to testifying falsely against a co-defendant because of personal
dislike for the co-defendant. The client admits that he wants to see
the co-defendant go to jail. Under the California Rules, the attorney
would be precluded from disclosing this falsehood in this situation.211
As a result, the attorney may have to sit and listen to the jury return
a guilty verdict against the co-defendant. This scenario is most troub-
ling. It cannot be argued that by remaining silent, the attorney is ad-
equately protecting the interests of his client. The system has truly
broken down in this situation, and there are few remedies.
Even though this scenario probably does not occur often, it demon-
strates the troubling effects the confidentiality rule can have on law-
yers in certain cases. Under 1986 Proposed Rule 4-102(E), the lawyer
in this situation would be free to disclose this evidence to the court,
thereby initiating remedial measures to prevent any prejudicial
effects.
VI. LIMITATIONS OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
Several limitations impair attorneys' efforts to cope with disclosure
rules. Before addressing some of the approaches an attorney may
employ to help alleviate the impact of the conflict between the attor-
ney's duty of candor to the court and the duty of confidentiality to
his client, two constitutional issues must first be discussed. As noted
earlier, the Rules of Professional Conduct of any jurisdiction must
yield to the constitutional rights of the client.212 Therefore, to be
211. As a result, a single attorney would be put into the position of not having to
decide what course of action to take. While it is regrettable that the attorney loses
some freedom to make his own ethical decisions, it is far more important that the Bar
establish a unified standard applicable to all attorneys.
212. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 3.3, para. 12 (noting the general rule
presented in paragraph 12 that constitutional rights are paramount). See Schneyer,
valid, any suggested approach to resolving the problem of client per-
jury must not violate these constitutional rights.
A. Client's Right to Testify
The most effective way to prevent the client from presenting false
testimony to the court would be to preclude the client from taking
the witness stand at all. Once sufficient evidence to form the basis
for a reasonable belief that the client will commit perjury becomes
known to the attorney, he can resolve the ethical dilemma by refus-
ing to call the client to the stand. The viability of this approach is
bolstered by the fact that before 1864, criminal defendants were sys-
tematically prevented from testifying on their own behalf.213 The
justification for the rule was the belief that such testimony would be
too susceptible to taint and abuse due to the intense interest of the
defendant in fabricating testimony.214 Today, however, a majority of
the states have statutes allowing criminal defendants to take the
stand in their own defense.215 But while the states and the federal
government 216 allow defendants to take the stand, the United States
Supreme Court has never ruled that the criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to testify on his own behalf.217
Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 WIs. L. REV. 1529,
1560 n.131.
213. Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961). Prior to 1864, the English common
law rule dictated that defendants were incompetent to testify. Maine became the first
state in America to enact a general competency statute allowing defendants to testify
in 1864. Id. at 577.
214., Id. at 573-76.
215. Id. at 596-98 (for a list of states adopting competency statutes).
216. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1982).
217. Appel & McGrane, supra note 128, at 6 (in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971), the Supreme Court alluded to the existence of a constitutional right to testify).
Cf. "A constitutionally based 'right to testify' is not violated when an attorney, pursu-
ant to the rule of a state criminal justice system, prevents a client from committing
perjury." Id. at 35.
The Supreme Court has alluded to the fact that such a right may exist, but has re-
frained .from addressing the point squarely. In Ferguson, the Court had the opportu-
nity to render a decision on the constitutionality of the right to testify but refused to
do so. Rather than addressing the issue, the Court based its decision on the fact that a
state could not deny a defendant the right to counsel. 365 U.S. at 596. Justice Frank-
furter wrote a separate opinion arguing that this case should have been decided on the
grounds of the right to testify rather than on a right-to-counsel basis. Id. at 599-600
(Frankfurter, J., separate opinion for reversal). In fact, only in dicta has the Court
held that an individual has the right to testify on his own behalf. In Harris, the Court
stated that "[e]very criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense or
refuse to do so." 401 U.S. at 225. The issue in this case focused upon whether an
otherwise inadmissible statement by the defendant could be used for impeachment
purposes. Id. at 222. The Court answered affirmatively, noting that a right to testify
does not include the right to commit perjury. Id. at 225. Furthermore, the Court held
that the right to testify may be grounded in due process considerations. Faretta v. Cal-
ifornia, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). In Faretta, the Court held that a criminal defendant has
the right to conduct his own defense. Id. Again, the Court merely alluded to the guar-
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The California Supreme Court has declared that the defendant has
a constitutional right to testify.218 In People v. Robles,219 the court
held that "the right to testify in one's own behalf is of such funda-
mental importance that a defendant who timely demands to take the
stand contrary to the advice given by his counsel has the right to give
an exposition of his defense before a jury."220 The court declared
that the right to testify is fundamental, and the attorney's power to
control court proceedings must not deprive the defendant of his fun-
damental rights. Accordingly, attorneys are prohibited from prevent-
ing the defendant from taking the stand in California.221
Since a California defendant has the right to testify in his own be-
half, any California Rule of Professional Conduct that would inter-
fere with the defendant's right to testify would be contrary to the
Constitution of California and hence, invalid. While the California
Supreme Court has held that the defendant ought to be afforded the
right to be heard, 222 the United States Supreme Court has also recog-
nized that this right may be limited or curtailed under certain cir-
antee of a right to testify in dicta. Id. at 819 n.15. As a result, the lower federal courts
have been without guidance from the Supreme Court on this issue.
Several federal circuit courts of appeal have held that criminal defendants have a
constitutional right to testify on their own behalf. See Alicea v. Gagnon, 675 F.2d 913,
920-23 (7th Cir. 1982); See also Whiteside v. Scurr, 744 F.2d 1323, 1329-30 (8th Cir.
1984), rev'd sub nom. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (reversing on the grounds
that the conduct of an attorney in admonishing his client for intending to commit per-
jury and threatening to disclose such perjury to the court did not amount to ineffective
counsel); United States v. Bifield, 702 F.2d 342, 347-49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
931 (1983). But while the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have rendered decisive
opinions on the matter, several others, including the Ninth Circuit, have remained si-
lent.
In Alicea v. Gagnon, the Seventh Circuit upheld a decision by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court holding invalid a state statute which prohibited a criminal defendant
from testifying in his own defense unless he had given adequate notice to the prosecu-
tion of the defendant's intent to present an alibi defense. 675 F.2d at 919-20, 923. The
court held that this "notice-of-alibi" statute violated the defendant's constitutional
right to testify under the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments. Id. at 913.
In Bifield, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the criminal defendant has
a constitutional right to testify. 702 F.2d 342. The court reviewed the issue at length
and noted that although the "right to testify has never been resolved authoritatively
by the Supreme Court . . . we believe that such a constitutional right exists." Id. at
347.
218. People v. Robles, 2 Cal. 3d 205, 466 P.2d 710, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1970); see Peo-
ple v. McKenzie, 34 Cal. 3d 616, 668 P.2d 769, 194 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1983).
219. 2 Cal. 3d 205, 466 P.2d 710, 85 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1970).
220. Id. at 215, 466 P.2d at 716, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
221. Id. at 214, 466 P.2d at 716, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 172. See People v. McKenzie, 34 Cal.
3d 616, 631 n.9, 668 P.2d 769, 779 n.9, 194 Cal. Rptr. 462, 472 n.9 (1983).
222. 2 Cal. 3d at 214-15, 466 P.2d at 716, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 172-73.
cumstances.223 This principle is buttressed by the United States
Supreme Court's holding that, "[a]lthough mindful that courts must
indulge every reasonable presumption against the loss of constitu-
tional rights, we explicitly hold today that a defendant can lose his
right to be present at trial .... 224
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held in United States v.
Bifield225 that although the defendant has the right to testify, this
right "is not without limits."226 The court noted that "[i]n responding
to the charges against him, an accused must comply with the estab-
lished rules of procedure and evidence . ". .. 227 In United States v.
Curtis,228 the Seventh Circuit held that "a defendant has no constitu-
tional right to testify perjuriously in his own behalf."229 Although
the court only alluded to the appropriate standard the attorney
would be held to maintain in his determination of when the defend-
ant will commit perjury, the court stated that "[b]ecause it seems ap-
parent that [the defendant] would have testified perjuriously,
counsel's refusal to put him on the witness stand cannot be said to
have violated [his] constitutional rights."2 30
In Nix v. Whiteside,231 the Supreme Court echoed these same con-
siderations. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, declared
in dicta that "[w]hatever the scope of a constitutional right to testify,
it is elementary that such a right does not extend to testifying
falsely."232 The Court went on to note that the lawyer who cooper-
ates with his client to present perjured testimony "would be at risk
of prosecution for suborning perjury, and disciplinary proceedings,
including suspension or disbarment."233 From these pronounce-
ments, it seems that the Court is not only going to allow attorneys to
prevent their clients from testifying falsely, but will sanction them
for failing to either withdraw from the case or prevent their clients
223. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1969), reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 915 (1970). This
case dealt with the power of a trial court to expel the defendant after warning him
that his conduct was too disruptive to maintain the dignity, order, and decorum neces-
sary to conduct the trial. The Court expressly rejected the argument that the defend-
ant's sixth amendment right to be present in the courtroom is absolute. Id. at 342.
224. Id.
225. 702 F.2d 342 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931 (1983).
226. Id. at 350.
227. Id.
228. 742 F.2d 1070 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1374 (1984).
229. Id. at 1076.
230. Id. See also id. at 1076 n.4 (court seemed to adopt or suggest that the defense
attorney ought to refer to the Defense Function Standards to resolve this issue).
231. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
232. Id.
233. Id. The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the failure of the attorney
to withdraw from the case once the attorney "knows" that the client intends to perpe-
trate a fraud upon the court is grounds for discipline. Matter of Palmer, 296 N.C. 638,
252 S.E.2d 784 (1979).
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from giving false testimony, even to the extent of preventing them
from taking the witness stand.
It must be noted, however, that even though Justice Burger de-
clared that the defendant does not have a right to testify falsely, this
remark was not part of the holding. Justice Brennan's concurring
opinion noted: "Let there be no mistake: the Court's essay regarding
what constitutes the correct response to a criminal client's suggestion
that he will perjure himself is pure discourse without force of
1aw." 234
The courts are in general agreement that the defendant who seeks
to take the witness stand and testify truthfully has a right to do so.
But the issue of whether a lawyer, after discovering that the client
intends to commit perjury, can prevent the defendant from taking
the stand, remains. There is, however, only limited authority for the
proposition that such a power on the part of the attorney exists. In
any event, it seems clear that if the attorney does prevent the client
from taking the stand for fear that the client will give false testi-
mony, the attorney will not be held to have rendered ineffective
assistance of counsel.235
The California attorney who finds himself in this situation may not
have the option to prevent the client from taking the witness stand.
Under the California Rules of Professional Conduct, the defendant's
right to testify supersedes the attorney's duty as officer of the court.
While there seems to be a trend in other jurisdictions toward al-
lowing attorneys this discretion, California has not followed this line
of cases.
B. Right of Effective Assistance of Counsel
In light of the fact that nearly any remedial measure undertaken
by the attorney will result in a conflict with the interests of the cli-
ent, an issue arises as to whether this conflict violates the defendant's
right to effective counsel under the sixth amendment. The sixth
amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the right of
234. 475 U.s. at 175 (Brennan, J., concurring).
235. Id. at 992. The Court held that "there is no constitutional right to present a
perjured defense." Id. A Florida state Court of Appeals held that since the defendant
does not have the right to commit a fraud upon the court, an attorney who fails to call
a particular witness because he believes the witness will commit perjury has not ren-
dered ineffective assistance. Sanborn v. State, 474 So. 2d 309, 312 (Fla. 1985).
assistance of counsel to criminal defendants.236 The Supreme Court
has declared that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no per-
son may be imprisoned for any offense ... unless he was represented
by counsel ... ,"237 In light of this right to counsel, the Court held in
Strickland v. Washington that the purpose of the sixth amendment
right of counsel was to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial.238
The Court thus held that the defendant must be provided with effec-
tive assistance of counsel in order that these interests are protected
and preserved. 239
It has been argued that the imposition of a mandatory duty upon
the attorney to disclose all false evidence presented to the court
would result in conflict of interest between the attorney and client,
stifling the ability of the attorney to render effective assistance.2 40
The Eighth Circuit determined that this conflict of interest resulted
in ineffective assistance. 241
If the attorney attempts to prevent the client from taking the stand
by means other than passive persuasion,242 an actual conflict of inter-
est between the attorney and his client is present.243 It has been held
that under these circumstances a presumption of ineffectiveness is
raised.244
The Supreme Court, however, laid this argument to rest in its
opinion in Nix.245 The defendant (Whiteside) claimed that he was
denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney (Robinson)
refused to allow him to present perjured testimony to the court.246
The court relied upon its decision in Strickland247 in evaluating the
defendant's claim. In Strickland, the Court held that in order for the
movant to prove that he has been denied effective assistance of coun-
236. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding
that the sixth amendment mandates that indigent defendants be appointed counsel).
237. 407 U.S. at 37; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963).
238. 466 U.S. 668, 687, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984).
239. Id. at 687.
240. Grady, supra note 89, at 13-16.
241. Id. at 12 n.93. The court in Whiteside v. Scurr argued that:
a lawyer who has a firm factual basis for believing that his or her client is
about to commit perjury, because of confidential communications the client
has made to the lawyer, may not disclose the content of those communications
to the trier of fact .... The lawyer who discloses confidential communications
or who threatens to do so has departed from the role of an advocate and has
become an adversary to the interests of his or her client.
Id. (quoting Whiteside v. Scurr, 750 F.2d 713, 714 (9th Cir. 1984)), rev'd sub nom. Nix v.
Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
242. "Passive persuasion" includes remonstrating the client along the guidelines
provided in Model Rule 3.3 comment 11. See supra note 115.
243. Grady, supra note 89, at 14-15.
244. Id. at 15.
245. 475 U.S. 157.
246. Id. at 159.
247. 466 U.S. 668, reh'g denied, 467 U.S. 1267 (1984).
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sel, he must show serious attorney error and prejudice.24 8 The Court,
however, found that there was no actual conflict of interest between
Whiteside and Robinson. Since an attorney has an ethical obligation
to prevent the introduction of false evidence to the court,249 the
Court ruled that Robinson's attempts to prevent Whiteside from
committing perjury were within the standard of "reasonable profes-
sional conduct." 250 Since the Court could find nothing wrong with
Robinson's conduct, it therefore rejected Whiteside's claim.
The position of the Court was supported by the concurring Jus-
tices. Justice Blackmun wrote that the defendant "had no legitimate
interest that conflicted with [his attorney's] obligations not to suborn
perjury ...."-251 This is a significant affirmation of the majority's
opinion on this issue. The Nix decision affirms the principle that the
Court will allow attorneys great latitude in their efforts to prevent
clients from committing perjury.
C. Pre-Trial Intent to Commit Perjury
The various standards of ethical conduct discussed earlier in this
comment offer criminal defense attorneys a number of avenues for
dealing with the ethical dilemma of client perjury. While some of
these approaches are clear and concise, each one leaves a great deal
of discretion to the individual attorney to resolve the issue. The Pro-
posed Rule 4-102, however, differs in a significant way from these
ethical standards. Proposed Rule 4-102 provides that once the attor-
ney is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant has
committed a fraud upon the court, the attorney must disclose this
false evidence to the court. As noted earlier, however, this rule does
not provide additional guidance to the attorney who discovers his cli-
ent's wrongful intention before the client takes the witness stand.252
Once an attorney has discovered that his client intends to commit
perjury before trial, it is recommended by most commentators that
the attorney make a good faith attempt to discourage the client from
defrauding the court or to encourage disclosure after its occur-
248. Id. at 687.
249. CODE, supra note 38, EC 7-6. The attorney "may not do anything furthering
the creation or preservation of false evidence." Id. See supra notes 21-28 and accompa-
nying text.
250. 475 U.S. at 166.
251. Id. at 187 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
252. See supra notes 168-171.
rence.253 Existing case law is also generally supportive of this re-
quirement. 254 This requirement that the attorney show some
disapproval for the client's attempt to defraud the court is necessary
in order to ensure that the attorney does not passively assist in the
presentation of false evidence to the court.255 The requirement is in-
tended to demonstrate that the client's conduct is not supported by
the Bar Association and the legal profession.256
In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Nix v. Whiteside, which
held that threatening to disclose confidential information of the cli-
ent to the court as a means of persuading the client not to commit
perjury is permissible conduct,257 it seems that the mandatory disclo-
sure rule should increase the persuasiveness of the attorney's warn-
ings to the client, since there is nothing to stop the attorney from
disclosing this to the court.258
If the client nevertheless refuses to refrain from committing per-
jury, some commentators suggest that the attorney should withdraw
from the case.259 The drawbacks to withdrawal have been previously
mentioned and focus upon the fact that withdrawal requires the ap-
proval of the court and that, if successful, the ethical problem is re-
solved only for that attorney. The client will receive another lawyer
and possibly another chance at defrauding the court.260
Under Proposed Rule 4-102(E), however, the attorney would be re-
quired to wait until the client has actually committed a fraud upon
253. Wolfram, supra note 3, at 846.
254. Id. See In re Malloy, 248 N.W.2d 43, 45-46 (N.D. 1976) (the court held that the
attorney must attempt to persuade the client to refrain from committing perjury); see
also In re Robinson, 151 A.D. 589, 592, 136 N.Y.S. 548, 551 (1912) (attorney disbarment).
255. Wolfram, supra note 3, at 846. It is true that this requirement does very little
to ensure that the attorney will not assist his client in the presentation of perjured tes-
timony. In a situation of conspiracy to commit false testimony, the attorney could go
through the motions of discouraging the client from presenting false testimony while
both realize that the advice is as meaningless as the proposed testimony. It should be
noted, however, that this process does provide an important symbolic message to attor-
neys that the court disapproves of any attempt on the part of the attorney to assist in
client perjury. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 172 (1986).
256. See 1987 Proposed Rules, supra note 6, Rule 3-100(E), pt. IV, at 19.
257. 475 U.S. at 176. The ABA Standing Committee stated that once the attorney
discovers that his client intends to commit perjury he is directed to warn the client of
the consequences of this action, and if the client persists, to disclose this falsehood. See
supra note 121. The Committee went on to suggest that the attorney could prevent
the client from taking the stand if permitted by the legal jurisdiction. Id. But where
the client is granted the right to testify, the Committee suggests that the attorney can
reveal to the court the client's intent to commit perjury. Id
258. Contra Wolfram, supra note 3, at 865-66.
259. Callan & David, supra note 58, at 383; see generally CODE, supra note 38, D.R.
2-110; MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 3.3. Model Rule 3.3, para. 7 reads: "If the con-
frontation with the client occurs before trial, the lawyer ordinarily can withdraw." See
MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 3.3, para. 11 ("the advocate should seek to withdraw
if that will remedy the situation"). Id.
260. See Dunetz, supra note 4, at 434-36; contra Wolfram, supra note 3, at 857-60.
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the court before disclosure becomes mandatory. 261 Therefore, for
those attorneys subject to this rule, it would be appropriate to remain
in the case despite awareness of the perjurious intent of a client, and
await the presentation of the testimony. This is especially likely in
light of the negative effects of withdrawal, and the difficulty in deter-
mining whether the client truly intends to commit perjury.
The most compelling justification for this "wait-and-see" approach
is that it is the least disruptive alternative. If the client changes his
mind at the last moment, or the attorney is not convinced that the
testimony is false, the attorney can continue the trial as if the issue
had never been raised.26 2 Furthermore, this approach safeguards the
client from the attorney who mistakenly believes that the client in-
tends to commit perjury when, in fact, this was never the intention of
the client. The Proposed Rule would thus protect the client from the
gross injustice that could result if the attorney reacted
prematurely.263
The best alternative course of action for the attorney confronted
with evidence that the client intends to commit fraud upon the court
is to attempt to persuade the client to adopt a more appropriate trial
strategy. If the client does not relent but the attorney is not totally
convinced that the client will present false evidence,264 the attorney
should remain on the case and await the client's testimony. If the at-
torney then becomes convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the
client has presented false evidence to the court, his duty to disclose
the falsity would become mandatory under the Proposed Rule.265
This approach allows the attorney to assume that the client will tes-
tify truthfully, enabling the attorney to maintain loyalty to the client
261. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
262. Id. The mandatory disclosure requirement is applicable only in those circum-
stances when the attorney knows or should know beyond a reasonable doubt that the
evidence is false.
263. The gross injustice will occur if, in pursuit of proving that the client intends to
commit a fraud upon the court, the attorney may disclose confidential information to
the court which could be used against the client. See United States v. Grayson, 438
U.S. 41 (1978) (the Court held that a judge is permitted to consider perjured testimony
in sentencing even if the court held that the defendant's attempt to defraud the court
warrants a stronger sentence against the defendant). Id. at 54. See People v. Sal-
querro, 107 Misc. 2d 155, 433 N.Y.S.2d 711 (1980) (the court held that the attorney's
disclosure of confidential information to withdraw did not require the judge to disqual-
ify himself once the judge denied the attorney's motion).
264. If the attorney is convinced that the client will commit perjury, the attorney
may withdraw (under some circumstances this will be required) or he can prevent the
client from testifying.
265. See supra note 140 for full text of Proposed Rule 4-102(E).
as long as possible.266
D. Surprise Cient Perjury
The mandatory disclosure requirement imposed by Proposed Rule
4-102(E)267 upon the attorney who discovers that his client has com-
mitted a fraud upon the court provides a clear course of action for
the attorney. However, while this rule helps the attorney escape the
client perjury dilemma, the rule simply shifts the problem onto the
shoulders of the court. This may be preferable to the mandatory
withdrawal requirement since courts are able to impose sanctions or
other preventative means to stop perjury upon the defendant. How-
ever, the mandatory disclosure rule's high standards and other inher-
ent limitations reduce its overall effectiveness. 268
The Rule does, however, provide the attorney with a course of con-
duct that is clear and concise and which will not subject the attorney
to discipline or malpractice liability. No attorney has been disci-
plined, sanctioned, or prosecuted in a case where the client commit-
ted perjury, except where the attorney actually knew or should have
known that the testimony was false. In those situations in which the
attorney was in doubt as to the falsity of the testimony, the attorney
was permitted to err in favor of the client. Proposed Rule 4-102(E)
clarifies these principles.269 Under the Proposed Rule, the attorney
must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the testimony is
false before any duty to disclose to the court may arise. 270 In the ab-
sence of an admission on the part of the client, or an abundance of
clearly fraudulent conduct and evidence, reasonable doubt sufficient
to allow the attorney the discretion to permit questionable testimony
to be presented will almost always be present. Thus, the mandatory
disclosure rule does not put the attorney in a position of having to
reveal client confidences in order to elude prosecution for suborna-
tion, unless the evidence clearly demonstrates that the attorney
knew or should have known that the evidence was false. Only under
these clearly defined circumstances, would the attorney have to dis-
close or be subject to discipline.
266. If the attorney withdraws or prematurely discloses the attorney's concern to
the court, there is potential, if not actual, conflict of interest between the attorney and
client. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
268. But see Vangsness v. Superior Court, 159 Cal. App. 3d 1087, 1090, 206 Cal. Rptr.
45, 48 (1984) (holding that "[a]n attorney has a duty and a right to withdraw from a
case if his representation will violate his professional responsibility").
269. 1986 Proposed Rules, supra note 8, Rule 4-102(E), at 7.
270. See generally Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1985).
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VII. CONCLUSION
The California State Bar Association has refused to impose upon
its members a mandatory duty to expose their clients' attempts to
commit perjury. In light of the adoption of the Model Rules by the
American Bar Association and the majority decision in Nix v. White-
side,27 1 the legal environment seems more receptive to the suggestion
that making attorneys accountable for their clients' attempts to de-
fraud the court will increase the integrity of the legal profession.
Adoption of a mandatory disclosure rule therefore seems an appro-
priate step for the California Bar.
The issues surrounding the ethics of client perjury focus upon a
resolution of the various conflicting interests of the parties involved
in the judicial process. The resolution of this dilemma will necessar-
ily turn upon the moral and political ideals of the decision-makers in-
volved. As society becomes more critical of legal ethics,272 the Bar
will be prone to decide the issue accordingly. Since the Bar is depen-
dent upon the public for its social and economic well-being, it may be
presumed that the Bar will in the future impose stronger sanctions
against attorneys who violate its legal standards. Equally assured is
the enactment of rules and standards which require members to be
more responsible to the Bar for the conduct of their clients. Because
of the strong arguments available to both sides of this debate,
whether such an action would appear healthy or destructive will nec-
essarily depend upon the moral and political beliefs of the individual.
The California Proposal to make disclosure of client perjury
mandatory in cases in which the attorney knows beyond a reasonable
doubt that his client has committed perjury is a reasonable and prac-
tical resolution to the problem. While attorneys who do not think
that attorneys should be watchdogs for the Bar will scoff at such a
rule, it must be remembered that the alternative is to allow the client
to commit perjury. This is clearly unacceptable. In the overall bal-
ancing of the interests, the truth must be given supreme weight and
the integrity of the judicial system must be recognized.
The judicial system exists in order to find the truth. While we
must be highly sensitive to the rights of the individual, we must not
forget that the true purpose is fact-finding. The mandatory disclo-
271. Id.
272. The public perception of the legal profession has been declining over the last
five years. L.A. Times, Oct. 19, 1987, § I, at 1, col. 4. The explanation for this lack of
faith in the legal profession is the perception that lawyers are unethical. Some claim
that lawyers should not even be considered professionals. Id. at 16.
sure rule furthers the interests of the fact-finding function without
significant infringement of the rights of individuals. Therefore, its
adoption ought to be aggressively sought. Attorneys should not be
forced to sit back and acquiesce to the efforts of their clients to de-
fraud the judicial system.
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